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"Public Education In Shreds": Religious
Challenges To Curricular Decisions
In 1985, the head of the National Library Association's Office for
Intellectual Freedom reported calls from parents who were concerned about
the inclusion of certain books on school library shelves. One father voiced
concern over a book entitled Making it with Mademoiselle, saying that he
was "sure it was very titillating stuff."' The book was actually a collection
of sewing patterns published by "Mademoiselle" magazine.2 While this is
an extreme case, the controversy and notoriety surrounding recent cases
such as Smith v. Board of School Commissioners,3 Mozert v. Hawkins
County Board of Education,4 and Edwards v. Aguillard illustrate that
parental scrutiny of classroom materials and litigation based on mopl--or
sectarian grounds are making curriculum decisiong one of the most sensitive
areas in the field of education today.
Parents are concerned with the ideas and values being conveyed to their
children through the texts and classroom activities used by the public school
systems.6 Schools, as state agencies, are concerned with selecting books and
materials that will contribute to their goal of developing a responsible,
informed citizenry which knows and has internalized societal expectations,
values, and educational skills. 7 Thus, although parents and educators share
the goal of developing this nation's children into mature adults, the route
to achieving this common goal is often seen in diverse, and divisive, terms.
Parents, on the one hand, may want their children exposed only to ideas
congruent with their own religious beliefs-or at least with those considered
mainstream. Public educators, on the other hand, may wish to present a
broad spectrum of ideas from various cultures and subcultures, or a more
limited "core" of ideas that do not accord with the religious beliefs of all
the students and their parents. School officials must also be guided by the
1. "Banned Books Week '85"'" Off To Burning Start, Chi. Daily L. Bull., Sept. 10, 1985,
at 2, col. 2.
2. Id.
3. 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987). See infra text accompanying notes 99-120.
4. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1029 (1988). See infra text
accompanying notes 131-80.
5. 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987). See infra text accompanying notes 199-208.
6. See generally A. BURRON, J. EmsmoE & D. TURNER, CLASSROOMS IN CRIsIs (1986)
[hereinafter CLAssRooms IN Cmisis]; K. Gow, YES, VIRGINIA, TIHEsa Is RIGHT AND WRONG!
(1980).
7. In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986), the Supreme
Court stated that "the objectives of public education [are] the 'inculc[ation of] fundamental
values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system."' (quoting Ambach v.
Norwich, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)).
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principle that the first amendment "does not tolerate laws that cast a pall
of orthodoxy over the classroom." 8 Textbook selection committees are thus
faced with a weighty, yet delicate task: They must choose texts which 1)
satisfy traditional expectations for materials, such as thorough topic' cov-
erage, clear presentation and appropriateness for grade and skill level; 9 2)
promote the kind of societal values which the state has an interest in
engendering in its citizens;' 0 and 3) avoid treatment of religion that would
constitute an unconstitutional offense to, or burden on, students' religious
beliefs. "
In recent years, parents have increased efforts to influence school admin-
istrators to select a curriculum and materials that conform with their views
on what public education-particularly moral education-should be.' 2 The
potential danger of this situation was understood as early as 1947 by Justice
Jackson, concurring in McCollum v. Board of Education:
Authorities list 256 separate and substantial religious bodies to exist in
the United States. Each of them . . . has as good a right [as any other]
8. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 105 (1968) (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
383 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). In this context, the reference to "law" pertains to administrative
decisions made by the local school board.
9. School officials must be given the latitude to select one book over another based on
determinations that the book is "more relevant to the curriculum, or better written[, or] . . .
psychologically or intellectually [appropriate] for the age group . . . or because [of a belief]
that one subject is more important or is more deserving of emphasis." Board of Educ. v.
Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 880 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726, 757 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring)); cf. Smith, 827 F.2d at 693-94.
10. The Supreme Court has often recognized the appropriateness of the role of public
schools in "promot[ing] civic virtues," Ambach, 441 U.S. at 80, and in "awaken[ing] the
child to cultural values," Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). The Court has
even suggested that local schools have a "duty to inculcate community values." Pico, 457
U.S. at 869. The choice of textbooks that a school system will use is clearly germane to the
pursuit of these concededly legitimate government goals.
11. There is a countervailing concern that textbook publishers have gone to such lengths
to avoid accusations of promoting religion through their materials that the role and influence
of religion in the birth and growth of the United States has been downplayed to the point of
historical distortion. See War Between the Faiths, A.B.A. J., June 1, 1987, at 128 (discussing
a federal district court's finding that certain textbooks should be removed from the public
schools because their "failure to discuss the importance of religion in American history and
culture was 'so grave as to rise to a constitutional violation'); Woodward & Taylor, Secular
Humanism in the Dock, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 27, 1986, at 96 (criticizing the studious avoidance
of religion in public education by saying that "American teachers and textbook publishers are
so wary of discussing religion in the classroom that they are willing to distort history and
literature in order to avoid the subject"); Brandt, Defending Public Education From the Neo-
Puritans, EDUC. LEADERSHIP, May, 1987, at 3 (noting that "a growing number of liberals and
conservatives agree that the role of religion in human affairs should be more adequately
represented in the school curriculum").
12. Parent groups, ranging from those extremely conservative to those extremely liberal,
are producing publications that advise concerned parents on how to organize and mobilize
locally as efficient lobbying groups. See generally CLASSROoMs IN CRIsS, supra note 6, at 157-
67; PEOPLE FOR THE AM. WAY, THE ATTACK ON PUBLIC EDUCATION: NORTH CAROLINA'S
EXPERIENCE 30-34 (1985).
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to demand that the courts compel the schools to sift out of their teaching
everything inconsistent with its doctrines. If we are to eliminate every-
thing that is objectionable to any of these warring sects or inconsistent
with any of their doctrines, we will leave public education in shreds. 3
Despite this admonition, sects are currently demanding that schools, on an
informal basis, or governmental entities, through use of their coercive power,
eliminate "everything that is objectionable"' 4 from the public schools.
Federal courts are now being asked to balance the interests of three
significant forces at work in the public schools: 1) the state's interest in
providing a sound educational program within the practical confines of
available time, space, and resources; 2) the individual's interest in freedom
from coercion of conscience by the state; and 3) society's interest in
maintaining religious neutrality in education as guaranteed by the Consti-
tution. While these demands are not new to the federal judiciary, the current
wave of parental challenges to public education has made them more acute.
State officials have a legitimate interest in overseeing the education of
the youth of this country and a constitutionally imposed duty to ensure
that its institutions are not used to force unwanted religious doctrine upon
its citizens. Parents have a legitimate interest in the education of their
children and a constitutional right to free exercise of their religious beliefs.
These interests, duties, and rights often come into sharp conflict in the
arena of public education, particularly in the determination of the content
of the curriculum. As state officials seek to provide a complete educational
experience for public school students, parents seek remedies from state-
imposed burdens on their religion. Through a series of hypotheticals, this
Note will present the means by which parents try to shield their children
from ideas and materials opposed to their religious beliefs and practices.
Methods ranging from administrative accomodations to legal remedies to
resort to the political process will be analyzed in terms of their probability
of success and their educational ramifications.
Part I examines adjustments made by mutual agreement which work to
shield particular children from exposure to the challenged materials, while
allowing continued use of the texts by the remainder of the children enrolled
in the school system. Part II discusses litigation aimed at invalidating school
board decisions. Part III examines efforts by parent groups to influence
public schools through the political process by lobbying the state legislature
for passage of statutes that provide what they consider to be "fair" or
"equal" treatment of their views.' 5 More directly, parent groups may
organize to elect school board members whose decisions reflect their beliefs.
13. 333 U.S. 203, 235 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring).
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:286.1-.7 (West 1982). See infra notes 199-208
and accompanying text.
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Part III will also suggest the potential limitations that may be placed on
the decisions of a board elected through such parental activism.
I. ADMINISTRATiVE STRATEGIES
Hypothetical 1: A local school board, following the procedure established
by the state board of education, adopts a set of textbooks covering subjects
including biology, literature, home economics, and health. A parent group,
consisting primarily of fundamentalist Christians, has voiced objections to
the adoption of the texts. The parents contend that the selected texts present
and advocate ideas and values contrary to their religious beliefs. To avoid
exposing their children to these texts and materials, the parents petition the
local school board to substitute materials which they find acceptable or to
excuse their children from class when the challenged materials are being
used or discussed. If the board is unwilling or unable to accommodate their
wishes, the parents plan to remove their children from the public school
and educate them at home.
A. Substitution and Exclusion
Substitution 16 and exclusion'7 are the most informal, least expensive, and
possibly the least intrusive remedies parents might seek. They are also the
remedies most likely to succeed.' 8 Often either remedy can be worked out
16. A substitution remedy allows a student with religious objections to an officially adopted
text or activity to complete an alternative assignment which is mutually satisfactory to the
child, the parents, and the school.
17. An exclusion remedy allows a student to be excused from the classroom while activities
which she finds objectionable are being conducted.
18. The district court that heard Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools, 647 F. Supp.
1194 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d
1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1029 (1988), found that the state could achieve
its legitimate educational goals by means less restrictive than by compulsory use of a uniform
textbook series. Id. at 1202. Substitution and exclusion remedies were considered to be implicitly
allowed by legislative provisions for private and home schooling. Id. at 1201. The court
reasoned that temporary accommodations previously provided by the school indicated that
such arrangements were not too difficult to administer. Id. The court further supported the
feasibility of an alternative program with a prediction that "[a]ccommodating the beliefs of
[a few students] probably would not wreak havoc in the school system by initiating a barrage
of requests for alternate materials." Id. at 1202.
A school's provision of a substitution and exclusion option was the determinative factor in
Grove v. Mead School District No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826
(1985). The objecting student was given an alternative selection to read and was to be excused
from class during discussion of the offending material. The court of appeals found that any
burden on the student's free exercise rights arising from keeping the challenged book in the
curriculum was "minimal" and that no unconstitutional coercion was present. Id. at 1533.
The significance of the option is underscored in the concurring opinion, which noted that
facts "sufficient to present a free exercise challenge" would probably have existed had the
[Vol. 64:111
PUBLIC EDUCATION IN SHREDS
amicably between the parents and the teacher without any administrative
or other state involvement. 9
Parents who wish to challenge curricular decisions are typically funda-
mentalist Christians. Organizers of these parents identify substitution and
exclusion as viable protections against secular humanism,20 which they believe
student been compelled to read the book and participate in class discussion, rather than having
been offered and having rejected an alternative. Id. at 1542 (Canby, J., concurring).
A substitution or exclusion remedy will most likely fail if it is determined that the proposed
alternative is overly intrusive into the operation of public schools. Both the majority in Grove
and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Mozert rejected the adjustments to curricula
advocated by the plaintiffs at least in part on administrative grounds. The Grove court stated
that "[t]he state interest in providing well-rounded public education would be critically impeded
by accommodation of Grove's wishes [to remove the book from the curriculum entirely]."
Grove, 753 F.2d at 1533.
The Mozert court cited Supreme Court admonitions to use "care and restraint" when
contemplating judicial interference "chang[ing an] educational program adopted by duly chosen
local authorities." Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1069-70 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,
104 (1968)). Although the vulnerability of schools to increased litigation based on curricular
decisions "is certainly not determinative," the court indicated that it should be a consideration
since "nothing but educational confusion and a discrediting of the public school system can
result from subjecting it to constant lawsuits." Id. at 1069 (quoting McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 235 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
The two concurring judges in Mozert focused more on the day-to-day implementation
concerns facing the teachers and schools that will be called upon to carry out an individualized
remedy. Judge Kennedy described the mechanics of implementation at the classroom level-
review of materials by the parents and review of parental objections by the teacher, determi-
nation of what is objectionable, and omission of those topics from class coverage or dismissal
of the objecting student during their discussion-and concluded that requiring the school
district to "accommodate exceptions and permit other students to opt-out of the reading
program and other core courses . . . would result in a public school system impossible to
administer." Id. at 1072-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Judge Boggs concluded that a school's decision to deal with religious objections to curricular
content should be permissive rather than mandatory where the establishment clause is not
implicated. He stated that "li]t is a substantial imposition on the schools to require them to
justify in each instance of not dealing with students' individual, religiously compelled, objections
(as opposed to permitting a local, rough and ready, adjustment)." Id. at 1080 (Boggs, J.,
concurring) (emphasis in original).
19. Hulsizer, Public Education on Trial, EDUC. LEADERSHI, May, 1987, at 12, 16. See
also Jurenas, A Delicate Balance-A Familiar Dilemma, 16 AM. SECONDARY EDUC. 28, 30
(1987) ("[A]s a relatively common practice, on an individual basis, alternative texts, novels,
activities, etc. have frequently been made available to children whose parents found [the
officially adopted materials] somehow offensive.").
20. Fundamentalist parents found their concerns shared and their resistance efforts sub-
stantiated in Judge Brevard Hand's decision in Smith v. Board of School Commissioners, 655
F. Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala.), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987). Judge Hand held that secular
humanism is a religion, that it was being unconstitutionally advanced in the Mobile County
schools, and that the use of 46 texts considered to be violative of the establishment clause had
to be enjoined. Id. at 988.
The Supreme Court has never definitively ruled on the question of whether secular humanism
is or is not a religion within the meaning of the first amendment. Opponents of secular
humanism, who seek to have its influence purged from the public sphere, cite as determinative
of the issue its inclusion in a footnote listing "religions in this country which do not teach
what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God." See Torcaso v. Watkins,
1988]
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is communicated through public school texts. They advise parents to pursue
progressive actions beginning with a request to substitute materials. 21 They
suggest the following course of action for parents: explain religious objec-
tions to the school's selection of materials, consider alternative selections
offered by the teacher, and recommend their own selection of materials. 22
They go on to state that while most reasonable recommendations will be
accepted, parents should be prepared to go to the principal, superintendent,
school board, and court. 23
Seeking substitution or exclusion is often the first step toward litigation.
For example, a California student, Cassie Grove, was assigned to read the
novel The Learning Tree in her sophomore English class. After her mother
voiced religious objections to the book, Cassie was assigned another book
and allowed to leave class when The Learning Tree was discussed. 24 In
Tennessee, a group of parents convinced a middle school principal and two
elementary school principals to provide a completely separate reading pro-
gram for their children. 25 While these accommodations appeared to address
the concerns of the parents, the situations ripened into Grove v. Mead
School District No. 35426 and Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Edu-
cation.27 However, the issue ultimately litigated in both cases was not the
individualized remedy sought by these parents for their children. Not sat-
isfied with an individualized or group-specific remedy, the parents in Grove
and Mozert sought to have the challenged books deemed unfit for any child
and removed from use by the entire school system. 28
While the remedies of substitution and exclusion can alleviate tension
between parental religious beliefs and the responsibility of schools to educate
367 U.S. 489, 495 n.11 (1960). Federal courts, however, have not accepted this contention.
See infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
Although the federal judiciary has thus far declined to define or classify secular humanism,
definitions and classifications from other sources abound. For extensive discussions on the
topic, see generally Whitehead & Conlan, The Establishment of the Religion of Secular
Humanism and its First Amendment Implications, 10 Tax. TECH L. REv. 1 (1978); Note,
Secular Humanism, the Establishment Clause, and Public Education, 61 N.Y.U. L. RiEv. 1149
(1986) [hereinafter Establishment Clause]. For the purposes of this Note, secular humanism
will be defined as a school of thought which stresses the application of human reason in
problem solving, even in moral dilemmas; which emphasizes the autonomy of man; and which
has been identified by some as a religion, worshipping man over an omnipotent supernatural
being, and by others as an antireligion, actively working toward the destruction of traditional
theism.
21. CLASSROOMS IN CRIsIs, supra note 6, at 38.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Grove, at 1531.
25. Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1060 (6th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1029 (1988).
26. 753 F.2d 1528.
27. 827 F.2d 1058.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 98-120.
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children adequately, serious concerns emerge in the process of implementing
either device. What book will be substituted and who will choose it-the
child, the parent, the teacher, the parent with some sort of school super-
vision, some independent decisionmaker? Will the substitute provide an
equivalent as well as an alternative learning experience? How will the child's
progress be monitored and evaluated? These questions implicate both the
substantive content of public education 29 and the practical limitations of the
school's capacity to accommodate diversity.30
For the individual teacher or principal, the practical issues arising from
substitution or exclusion are daunting. Excluding a child during discussion
of objectionable material calls for many logistical decisions. Should she go
to the library, to a study hall or another class, or should she just sit in the
hallway until the session is over? Another consideration is how the teacher
should deal with subsequent class sessions. Is he allowed to make reference
to or answer questions about the objectionable material in the presence of
the religious objector? If he is not, must he forestall questions from other
students until he can make arrangements to protect the objecting child?
What procedure should be followed and what effect would this have on
course continuity? Who will police the arrangement to see that the exclusion
or substitution is being carried out properly?
The situation is complicated when more than one student is involved.
The logistics of location and supervision are much more difficult. Individuals
and groups could seek exemptions from different classes and activities and
ask for various alternatives. The school is left with merely a proposed
curriculum in which "any students whose beliefs are contradicted in the
classroom [are allowed] to participate selectively only in inoffensive parts
of the curriculum." 3' This would shatter any public school system unable
to provide the staff, funding and materials necessary to operate such a
fragmented program. 32
It can be predicted that most schools would instead call a halt to the
accommodation process and would probably find support in the courts.
"Despite the judiciary's tendency to respect parental requests for specific
[religious] exemptions, such requests have not been honored when they have
resulted in a disruption of the school or a significant interference with the
student's educational progress." 3 3 In Mozert, the parents succeeded with
29. See supra notes 9 and 10.
30. See supra note 18.
31. Hulsizer, supra note 19, at 16.
32. See Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1072-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[Accommodating] ex-
emptions from core subjects because of religious objections . . . would result in a public
school system impossible to administer.").
33. M. McCARTHY, A DELICATE BALANCE: CHURCH, STATE, AND THE SCHOOLS 63 (1983).
The author cites Hopkins v. Hamden Board of Education, 289 A.2d 914 (Conn. C.P. 1971),
1988]
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alternate reading programs in three schools.3 4 But when a petition was
submitted to provide the alternative program to an additional school and
to remove the text series from use in the system, the board balked. 35 The
alternative program was withdrawn and a resolution was passed stipulating
that only officially adopted textbooks were to be used. 36 Substitution and
exclusion are highly individualized remedies, and providing accommodations
for free exercise claimants directly and significantly conflicts with a school's
ability to fund and administer its overall curriculum. Courts have thus far
been leery of and resistant to sweeping systemic changes in curriculum and
text selection, evidencing a commitment to the state's compelling interest in
operating a feasible, manageable school system. 37
Attention must also be given to the emotional effects that substitution or
exclusion may have on the child. Children, particularly teenagers, are acutely
conscious of differences among students. 38 Requiring a student to leave class
in front of peers is often embarrassing, and the child may be subject to
challenge or ridicule later. Even if the student could go directly to the
alternative location, class absences might still be questioned by other stu-
dents.
aff'd, 305 A.2d 536 (Conn. 1973) (students not exempt from mandatory health class which
included instruction in sex education and family life) and Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395
(D.N.H. 1974) (students not exempt from health and music classes where instructional media
were used for academic, rather than solely entertainment purposes) as examples of denials of
exemption requests based on a "substantial disruption" rationale.
34. Mozert, 647 F. Supp. at 1196.
35. See Jurenas, supra note 19, at 28.
36. Mozert, 647 F. Supp. at 1196.
37. See supra note 18, paragraphs 3-6.
38. The Supreme Court has indicated in its decisions in other areas of school law that the
Court is aware of and concerned about the coercive pressure to conform to which students
may be subjected from the authoritative institution of public schooling and from the informal,
but formidable influence of their peers. The Court's concern has taken the form of invalidating
school practices involving prayer or scripture reading, see Abington Township School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); and mandatory flag
salute, see Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), even where the school provides
a nonparticipation option for objecting students.
The Court's most recent pronouncement in this area leaves no doubt that the public schools
will be scrupulously policed for instances of governmental attempts to coerce orthodoxy of
belief. In Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), the Court invalidated an amended Alabama
statute which required that each school day be opened with a moment of silence for meditation
"or voluntary prayer." Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, noted that while the availability
of a nonparticipation alternative "may reduce the constraint[,] it does not eliminate the
operation of influence by the school . . . outside [of its] domain. The law of imitation
operates, and non-conformity is not an outstanding characteristic of children." Id. at 61 n.51
(quoting McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
Justice O'Connor best described the dilemma facing a student whose beliefs conflict with a
school-mandated practice. She said that the student is "left with the choice of participating,
thereby compromising the nonadherent's beliefs, or withdrawing, thereby calling attention to
his or her nonconformity." Id. at 72 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Besides this awkwardness, ostracism is inherent in a remedy -of exclusion.
An elementary student undoubtedly feels confused and isolated when she is
told that she cannot participate in class activities such as holiday observances
or the daily routine of a flag salute. While an adult is capable of under-
standing the deprivations and persecutions that may attend religious practice,
these are advanced concepts for an elementary-aged child to accept on a
daily basis.
A distinct complication arises when an older child approaches school
officials saying that her personal religious convictions do not require pur-
suing the exclusion remedy, or that she has no religious objection to the
assigned material. The courts have never addressed the issue of whether the
school is obliged to enforce the remedy granted to the parents or to defer
to the judgment of the child for whose benefit the remedy was originally
sought.3 9
In spite of the initial complications and potential complexities, substitution
and exclusion may be the best options for parents who have objections to
the materials being used in the public school. Academic and administrative
39. Most disputes arising in the area of school law are phrased in terms of state interests
clashing with individual interests. Little attention is paid to the two distinct types of individuals
involved and their respective rights. Parents have an interest in rearing their children free of
undue governmental interference. This right has been recognized as having constitutional
stature as one of the privacy rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. See Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
Children have an interest, distinct from their parents, in exercising as much autonomy as
possible in a society that imposes significant limitations on a minor's capacity to act indepen-
dently. The Supreme Court has recognized that "[s]tudents in school as well as out of school
are 'persons' under our Constitution. . . .[They are] possessed of fundamental rights which
the State must respect." Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist. No. 511, 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
Among those constitutional rights inhering in school children are freedom of speech, Id. at
506, and freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
333-34 (1985). The Court has also alluded to an autonomy interest in students in a discussion
of the "unique role of the school library" where "selection of books . . . is entirely a matter
of free choice; [students have] an opportunity at self-education and individual enrichment that
is wholly optional." Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 869 (1981). The Court has also
cautioned, however, that considerations particular to public schools, such as the need to
maintain order and discipline and the overriding concern for the "captive audience," justify
limitations imposed on the rights of students which would be unconstitutional if applied to
adults. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506-07. See also Hazelwood School Dist.
v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562, 567 (1988); Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675, 684 (1986).
The potential for conflict between a parent and a child concerning an educational decision
to be made on behalf of the child was recognized by the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Consideration and determination of the issue was circumvented,
however, as the majority found "no reason for the Court to consider that point since it [was]
not an issue in [this] case." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 231. Justice Douglas would have remanded
the case in order to ascertain the opinions of the children involved, stating that if "the child
is mature enough to express potentially conflicting desires, it would be an invasion of the
child's rights to permit such an imposition without canvassing his views." Id. at 242 (Douglas,
J., dissenting in part).
19881
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concerns4° can be settled in advance so long as each side is aware of the
other's needs and of what is being given up under the arrangement.
Either substitution or exclusion may also be the least costly remedy. The
school may have texts that are acceptable, or parents may be allowed to
provide substitute materials from books they have at home. A court battle
can be forestalled and, if the change is implemented smoothly, the disruption
of removal from public school, the cost of private school, and the financial
and time investment that home schooling entails could be avoided.
B. Home Schooling
At the end of Hypothetical 1, the parents indicated that they might
remove their children from public school and engage in home schooling.
According to one survey, devout Christian parents who are dissatisfied with
the secular nature of public schools and who have not found satisfactory
religious schools comprise the largest growth group among home schoolers. 41
Dissatisfaction with values education often motivates removal of children
from public schools. Most teachers conduct discussions of values by asking
open-ended questions about values, ethics, or morals and by presenting a
variety of optional responses without giving authoritative right and wrong
answers. Critics of this method warn that exposure to different or situational
values will leave children "confused and valueless" and susceptible to
adopting the values of others.42 A Texas mother explained that she and her
husband elected home schooling for their children because "[we] want them
to have our values, not the values of their peers. ' 43 An estimated 120,000
to 260,000 children are currently being educated at home.44
Home educators must meet statutory requirements to satisfy state com-
pulsory education laws and must select materials that will both ensure an
adequate education and satisfy the increasing regulatory standards being set
by state boards of education. 45 Educational authorities seek to extend their
influence over home schools as far as possible in an attempt to assure that
home-educated children develop in social areas as well as in academic and
religious areas. The socialization of children is considered to be one of the
core functions of public education, 46 and widespread home schooling poten-
tially could subvert the accomplishment of that state goal.
40. See supra notes 9, 10, 18 and accompanying text.
41. Lines, An Overview of Home Instruction, 68 Pm DELTA KAPPAN 510 (1987) [hereinafter
Overview of Home Instruction].
42. Note, Delconte v. State: Some Thoughts on Home Education, 64 N.C.L. REv. 1302,
1325 (1986) [hereinafter Home Education].
43. Solorzano, Teaching Kids at Home Stirs a New Uproar, U.S. NEws AND WoR.LD
REPORT, Aug. 19, 1985, at 59.
44. Overview of Home Instruction, supra note 41, at 510.
45. Home Education, supra note 42, at 1313 & n.104.
46. Cf. supra note 7.
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State compulsory education laws have been adjusted to accommodate
increasing demands for home schooling.4 7 Today every state permits some
form of home instruction.4 Twenty-nine states explicitly allow in-home
instruction by a parent or tutor, 49 while twelve require either public school
attendance or some equivalent, non-school alternative with home schooling
statutorily or judicially recognized as "equivalent. "50 Nine states require
school attendance with home instruction recognized as "school." 5'
States, however, typically enumerate additional requirements that must
be met before a home instruction program qualifies as a school within the
meaning of the statute.5 2 Parents may be required to submit their home
tutoring plan to the state or local board of education, 53 or the progress of
the program may be monitored by certified teachers.5 4 Three states require
that the parent/tutors themselves be certified teachers. 5 Parents seeking to
educate their children at home must study their state's compulsory education
laws and be prepared to make a showing that their proposed program will
adhere to the statutory provisions.
56
Another consideration is the quality of the education that will be afforded
to home-schooled children, 57 and again the issue of material selection will
become both critical and controversial. One commentator, however, has
noted that although "some home-schooled children probably suffer from
negligent or incompetent parent/tutors . . .scattered testing data suggest
that successes are more numerous than failures in home-schools. 58 This
47. Solorzano, supra note 43, at 59.
48. Overview of Home Instruction, supra note 41, at 514.
49. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 6-15-501 (1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-13-91(2)(i), (3)(c)
(Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 167.031 (Vernon 1965 & Supp. 1988); VA. CODE ANN. §§
22.1-254 (1985 & Supp. 1987); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 28A.27.010(4) (Supp. 1987).
50. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 2703 (1981 & Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE § 33-202
(1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-8.1-3-34 (West 1984); OKvA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 10-105 (West
1972 & Supp. 1988).
51. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 156.160(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1987); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 115C-378 (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-34.1-01 (1981 & Supp. 1987).
52. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 6-15-503; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 167.031(2)(1)-(5).
53. Solorzano, supra note 43, at 59. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§16-46-1 to 10 (1987).
54. Solorzano, supra note 43, at 59. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.02(4) (West 1980 &
Supp. 1988).
55. Overview of Home Instruction, supra note 41, at 514. See IowA CODE ANN. § 299.1
(Vest 1949 & Supp. 1988); MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 388.553 (West 1976 & Supp. 1988);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-34.1-03(1).
56. North Carolina, for example, requires that teachers and curricula of home schools be
approved by the state board of education and that such schools adhere to attendance, health
and safety, and testing regulations. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-378, 115C-555 to 558.
57. One fundamentalist home educator has commented that "[a]ll you need to know is
how to read and apply common sense, and you can teach just about anything." Solorzano,
supra note 43, at 59. This kind of naivet6 concerning good teaching methods and the learning
process must certainly reinforce the concern of public educators.
58. Overview of Home Instruction, supra note 41, at 513.
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success rate has been attributed to individualized instruction, the personal
stake parent/teachers have in the child's progress, the increasing support of
home education associations, and the availability of professionally prepared
instructional materials59 such as packaged texts and workbooks, correspon-
dence course style materials, and videotaped lessons. Ironically the increased
availability and use of these materials, rather than assuaging the fears of
public educators with their professional preparation and comprehensive
scope, appear to be leading to the next phase of academic and legal
controversy 0
As prepared home instructional materials become more prevalent, it is
foreseeable that states will seek to regulate the curricula of home schools
and that home educators will seek to avoid regulation, just as they currently
seek to avoid public school attendance.6 ' Home educators will argue that
curricula regulation by state authorities will negate the desired effects of
home schooling. State approval could be conditioned on guidelines that
require instruction on the very concepts and values that parents are trying
to avoid. State boards of education will seek to expand their regulatory
power to ensure that home-schooled children will be provided a broad
education, adequate to prepare them for informed participation in society,
as well as the spiritual training their parents desire for them.6 2 While
statutorily allowed home schooling resolves the problem of efficiently ac-
commodating individual religious beliefs through the institutional structure
of public education, the remedy leaves unresolved the underlying conflict
between two constitutional values: the state's compelling interest in social-
izing students to be "good citizens," and the parents' free exercise right to
socialize their children according to wholly different value choices.
As home schooling becomes more common, legislators will be called upon
to draft compulsory education laws, home school qualifying provisions and
curriculum requirements that are specific enough to reassure educators that
59. Bolick, Home Schooling Offers Parents Some Alternatives, L.A. Daily J., Mar. 25,
1987, at 4, col. 5.
60. It has been predicted that the next wave of litigation will center around the content of
curricula in home schools as public education officials push to prescribe texts or require that
materials used be submitted for approval. Overview of Home Instruction, supra note 41, at
514-15.
61. Id.
62. Ironically, criticisms by public educators leveled at Christian-oriented materials closely
parallel those made by fundamentalist parents against texts adopted in public schools. See
supra note 11. See generally Fleming & Hunt, The World as Seen By Students in Accelerated
Christian Education Schools, 68 Pm DELTA KAPPAN 518, 523 (1987) (accusing materials prepared
by Accelerated Christian Education [ACE] of giving "a very limited and sometimes inaccurate
view of the world-one that ignores thinking above the level of rote recall"). But see Johnson,
ACE Responds, 68 Pm DELTA KAPPAN 520 (1987) (justifying the ACE approach by maintaining
that instruction should be conclusive rather than speculative and that "the final interpretation
of facts and events should [not] be left up to immature, inexperienced minds, as [in] mainline
secular curricula").
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adequate general instruction is being provided. The provisions will also have
to be flexible enough to afford home schoolers the latitude to tailor
education for their children. 63 Once the legislation is passed, it is sure to
be challenged by both parents and schools. Parents will more likely test the
statute's validity in the courts, claiming that it restricts their free exercise
rights and should be invalidated 4 Schools probably will use the legislative
process and seek direct changes in the statutory provisions. It is possible
that a school might bring truancy and neglect charges against parents whose
home instruction plans are considered inadequate in order to amass evidence
to present to the legislature that the statute is too lax to achieve state
educational goals.
Once presented with a challenge to the state's home education statute, a
court will implement a decision-making process which balances how well
the particular law and the particular home instruction program advance the
state's goal while affording the individual his free exercise and free speech
rights. 65 Presumably workable laws will be developed on a case-by-case basis
as courts validate some legislative provisions by requiring home schoolers
to bring their plans up to statutory standards and invalidate other legislative
provisions by sustaining parental challenges. States are generally recognized
to have the power to set the minimum school day and year, to require
students to take standardized achievement tests, and to require the school
to submit test scores and other relevant data to state authorities. 66 However,
63. Legislators must also be aware of the danger of being overly broad. In the evolution
of current compulsory education laws, at least one state's statute was invalidated as being void
for vagueness because it required school attendance without defining what constituted a school.
See Lines, Private Education Alternatives and State Regulation, 12 J.L. & EDUC. 189, 211
(1983).
64. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 144-49. The same kind of analysis used to assess
the constitutionality of an administrative decision made by a government agency would be
used to test such a statutory provision for a first amendment violation.
65. One commentator has indicated that once a home schooling plan is instituted, the
choice of texts and materials used would implicate free speech issues based on the right to
have or not have communicative materials in one's home. See Overview of Home Instruction,
supra note 41, at 514-15. Free speech considerations of curricular choices in home instructional
plans are beyond the scope of this Note, but it is difficult to see how a free speech challenge
to curricular regulation in a home schooling plan would have any more force than any other
challenge to the contents of compulsory education. The Supreme Court has long recognized
that the state has a powerful interest in defining the content of mandatory public education.
See Pico, 457 U.S. at 863-64; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534. This interest,
and its attendant power to regulate, is limited marginally, however, by an individual's right
to religious or intellectual autonomy. See Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927) (state
overstepped authority in regulating private foreign-language schools); Meyer, 262 U.S. 390
(state statute prohibiting the teaching of German to public or private school students in grades
1-8 held unconstitutional).
66. Overview of Home Instruction, supra note 41, at 515. The Supreme Court has held
that state funds may be spent for texts and testing services provided to nonpublic schools since
"[t]here is no question that the State has a substantial and legitimate interest in insuring that
its youth receive an adequate secular education." Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 240 (1977).
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the extent of legitimate state regulation of content in home schools is yet
to be determined.
The ability of the home-schooled child to function in the larger society
should also be taken into account. Schools provide one of the primary
opportunities for the social growth and development of children, and there
is concern that home-educated children "are not acquiring fundamental
skills needed for good citizenship and self-sufficiency." 67 Proponents of
home schooling recognize the validity of the state's interest in socialization.
They maintain, however, that there is no "correct" socialization process in
a pluralistic society 8 and suggest scouting, church groups, and community
activities as alternative social outlets. 69
Most public educators, however, are not convinced that such alternatives
are sufficient. An Idaho school superintendent has commented that "part
of the whole schooling process is learning to live in society and communicate
with others . . . . People who are home-schooled miss out on that. ' 70 The
inclusion or omission of alternative social activities might be a factor in
evaluating the adequacy of a proposed home instruction plan, but cannot,
by itself, be determinative. Given the previous legislative and judicial
determinations7' that home schooling represents an acceptable alternative to
education outside the home, it may be too late for public educators to
argue that the social process contained in the school building is a central
feature of the compelling state interest in education.
II. JuDiciAL RESPONSES
Hypothetical 2: The school board decides that it does not have the funds,
facilities, or personnel necessary to substitute materials and adequately
ensure equivalent topic coverage and mastery, or to excuse students and
provide supervision and meaningful activity during time spent out of class.
The parents who wish to home educate their children do not meet the
statutory requirements to exercise this option. Having been denied a local
administrative remedy, the parents turn to the judicial system.
The parents seek to invalidate the school board's decision to adopt the
challenged texts, claiming that the use of the books and materials is an
The Court then appears to authorize at least threshold state regulation of such schools by
saying that "[tihe State may require that schools that are utilized to fulfill the State's
compulsory-education requirement meet certain standards of instruction . . . and may examine
both teachers and pupils to ensure that the State's legitimate interest is being fulfilled." Id.
Accord Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653-54 (1980).
See also Home Education, supra note 42, at 1308-09.
67. Lines, supra note 63, at 191.
68. Home Education, supra note 42, at 1322.
69. Bolick, supra note 59, at 4.
70. Solorzano, supra note 43, at 59.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 47-52.
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unconstitutional establishment of religion by a governmental body. The
parents seek a broad remedy which would prevent the use of the materials
by the entire school system based on a finding that the textbook series is
unsuitable for their children and also for all other children in the school
district.
Alternatively, the parents seek a more individualized remedy based on a
free exercise challenge. The parents ask the court to use its coercive power
to force the school system to relieve the burden on the practice of their
children's religious beliefs. The remedy would be the same as that initially
sought at the informal administrative stage-substitution, exemption or
home schooling-but it would be enforced by court order.
A. Establishment Challenge
An establishment clause challenge to the selection and adoption of a
textbook series or a classroom activity will most likely be based on the
premise that the target materials impermissibly establish secular humanism
as a government-endorsed religion.7 2 Fundamentalists claim that the "trans-
ferring, through public education, of humanist idology [sic] to succeeding
generations" 73 has displaced traditional theism, particularly Christianity,
from its "historically preferred position" 74 in the institutional life and public
discourse of the United StatesY.7  Some materials and activities commonly
cited as being particularly offensive include The Wizard of Oz, The Diary
of Anne Frank,6 keeping diaries, 77 and in-class writing and discussion on
72. Curriculum decisions might alternatively be challenged as being slanted against all
religions or as being so permeated with sectarian content as to be non-neutral among religions.
73. Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 20, at 29.
74. Id. at 7.
75. Id. at 6-7.
76. Cooper, Opposing Sides See Satan as Either Humanism or Censorship, L.A. Daily J.,
June 23, 1987, at 4, col. 6. The Wizard of Oz is considered objectionable generally for dealing
with the occult and mysticism and particularly for telling children that there can be good
witches. The Diary of Anne Frank faces what is probably the more serious charge of moral
relativism for a passage reading as follows: "I don't mean you have to be orthodox or believe
in heaven or hell and purgatory . . . I just mean some religion." Moral relativism can be
described as a "[speculatively produced] set of arbitrary absolutes or situational ethics,"
Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 20, at 55, or as characterizing right and wrong as "entirely
relative depending on the situation and especially on the child's point of view at any given
time." K. Gow, supra note 6, at 13. The condemnation associated with the term "moral
relativism" arises from indicating to children that a person can develop his own value system
rather than that there is a set of absolute moral standards. Id. at 77-80.
77. Submitting a journal for a class project is challenged on the grounds that it intrudes
on family privacy since children are likely to write about occurrences in the home and because
the child may feel that she must reveal and defend personal ethical or moral values. Some
parents believe that such an activity will cause children to criticize and question parental
decisions and authority. K. Gow, supra note 6, at 23-24, 194.
1988]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
resolving moral problems.78 School representatives typically contend that
rather than establishing the tenets of a religious or value system, the texts
and materials are used in pursuance of developing critical thinking skills
and the broad awareness of cultural differences necessary to function in a
pluralistic society.79
Although the Supreme Court has decided many establishment clause cases
in the area of public education, °0 no case has squarely presented the question
of whether a particular curriculum plan or textbook series impermissibly
establishes secular humanism as a religion. Until the Supreme Court resolves
this discrete issue, lower federal courts will have to decide curricular and
textbook issues on the basis of the reasoning behind other establishment
clause cases.
In some establishment clause cases, the Supreme Court has used consti-
tutional analyses such as an "original intent" test8 or a rationale, that defers
to traditional practices.8 2 In the context of public education, however, the
Court has consistently applied the three-part test established in Lemon v.
Kurtzman."' The Lemon test requires that governmental action 1) have a
secular purpose, 2) have no primary effect of advancing religion, and 3)
involve no excessive entanglement of government with religion in order to
pass constitutional muster. 4 The first and second prongs have been modified
78. Typically, such an exercise would present a problem and possible responses. The
students would write an essay telling which response they would choose and why. The class
would then discuss the "ramifications and intellectual sufficiency" of the responses. The
activity may be criticized as advocating situational ethics over acting according to a set of
predetermined values and as telling children that moral dilemmas can be resolved by applying
logical methodology. See Note, The Establishment Clause, Secondary Religious Effects, and
Humanistic Education, 91 YALE L.J. 1196, 1205-09 (1982).
79. See, e.g., Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987). See also
infra text accompanying note 113.
80. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987) (balanced treatment statute invalid);
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (monitoring system in release time program invalid);
Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (public school teachers not allowed
to teach in private schools); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (moment of silence statute
unconstitutional as written); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (Ten Commandments may
not be posted in classrooms); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (balanced treatment
statute invalid); Abington Township School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (disallowed
opening of school day with Bible reading); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (disallowed
group recitation of school prescribed prayer); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (release
time program for off-grounds religious instruction upheld); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333
U.S. 203 (1948) (disallowed use of public school buildings for religious instruction); Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upheld publically-financed transportation for parochial
students).
81. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (opening legislative session with
prayer).
82. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (inclusion of a creche in municipally-
sponsored holiday display).
83. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
84. Id. at 612-13.
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somewhat in subsequent cases.85 Unless the Supreme Court departs from
precedent, the Lemon test will likely be the method of analysis applied to
textbook challenges in one form or another.8 6
Supreme Court rulings on disputes concerning religion in public schools
are highly fact-sensitive. 7 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia have
pointed out that establishment clause analysis has produced unpredictable
and seemingly inconsistent results from one case to the next. 8 It is probably
safe to speculate, however, that establishment clause challenges to curricula
and textbooks will produce more predictable results. It is unlikely that an
establishment clause challenge will be successful unless the texts openly
endorse or discredit a particular religion or advocate atheism, or the activities
require a profession or denial of belief. Although to date the Court has
found an establishment clause violation in every education case it has
considered89 except two, 90 a school board should be able to demonstrate
that its curriculum and textbook choices are in compliance with constitu-
tional mandates by applying the three prongs of the Lemon test to the
criteria used in making the choices and to the consequences that the
implementation of those choices is likely to have.
The first prong of the Lemon test requires that a secular purpose underlie
the governmental action being challenged. 9' The Court in Lynch v. Donnelly92
seemingly interpreted "a" secular purpose to mean "any" secular purpose. 93
The majority in Edwards v. Aguillard,94 however, subsequently stated that
although "the Court is normally deferential to a state's articulation of a
secular purpose . . . the statement of such purpose must be sincere and
not a sham." '95 The most recent statement of the test came in 1985 when
85. See infra text accompanying notes 91-96, 103-06.
86. Smith, 827 F.2d 684, and Grove v. Mead School District No. 345, 753 F.2d 1528 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985) presented precisely this issue and were decided in this
manner. See infra text accompanying notes 91-120.
87. Strossen, "Secular Humanism" and "Scientific Creationism". Proposed Standards for
Reviewing Curricular Decisions Affecting Students' Religious Freedom, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 333,
334-35 (1986).
88. See, e.g., Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2591-2607 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Wallace, 472 U.S.
at 107-14 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting).
89. See supra note 80.
90. Everson, 330 U.S. 1, upheld the public financing of transportation of parochial school
students as a permissible accommodation of religion rather than an impermissible establishment
of one. Zorach, 343 U.S. 306, reached the same conclusion concerning a student release time
program.
91. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
92. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
93. The Court said that celebrating and depicting traditional national holidays were legit-
imate secular purposes of government agencies, that including a creche in an otherwise
nonreligious display did not offend the establishment clause, and that any inference "that the
city ha[d] no secular purpose was . . . clearly erroneous." Id. 465 U.S. at 681.
94. 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1985).
95. Id. at 2579.
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the Supreme Court expressly adopted the language suggested in Justice
O'Connor's Lynch concurrence that the focus of the first prong should be
on whether the "government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove
of religion. '"96 Regardless of which statement of the test .is used-'"a
purpose," "any purpose," "a sincere purpose," or "no purposeful en-
dorsement"-a school administration can satisify the purpose prong of the
Lemon test so long as the board's decisions concerning curriculum and texts
are not tainted by some clear indicia of unconstitutional intent. 97
An adequate secular purpose can be found in virtually any textbook
selection process which bases its decision on skill development, topic cov-
erage, or method of presentation, regardless of any moral or value-oriented
message that the materials may be alleged to contain. In spite of the
substantial fine-tuning of the doctrine, the presence of a secular purpose is
rarely at issue in an establishment challenge. A federal court found an
adequate secular purpose, that of exposing students to different cultures
and attitudes, in a school board's decision to include the novel The Learning
Tree in its curriculum in Grove v. Mead School District No. 354.95 Smith
96. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56. In addition to the endorsement alternative to the original
"neither advances nor inhibits" standard, other statements of the purpose prong have been
proposed. These include a neutrality standard, which would divide government action into
categories of impermissible pro-religious and anti-religious actions and permissible non-religious
actions, Establishment Clause, supra note 20, at 1173-75; a coercion standard, which would
invalidate government action only where there is a threat that a person would be forced to
adhere to or denounce a particular belief, Note, Wallace v. Jaffree and the Need to Reform
Establishment Clause Analysis, 35 CArT. U.L. REv. 573, 588-89 (1986); and a no-preference
standard, which would prohibit putting one religious belief, sect, or tradition into a "legally
preferred" position, Cord, Church-State Separation and the Public Schools: A Re-evaluation,
EDUC. LEADERSHW, May, 1987, at 26, 29. Cord also contends that adopting the no-preference
standard would return "policy decisions to the appropriate educational authorities, elected or
appointed, and reduce the all too frequent present pattern of government by judiciary." Id.
at 31. The concept that unifies all of the suggested standards is that the government must do
something to indicate that one religion, or no religion, is recognized as better than other belief
systems. The problem will be in identifying how and at what point a governmental action has
conferred such recognition.
97. For example, public statements made by school administrators indicating that religion
is being purposefully subrogated, that one religion is being advanced over others, or that
religion is being advocated over nonreligion, would be a clear indication that constitutional
mandates concerning religion were being violated. The Court, however, has long acknowledged
the broad deference to public school administrators in the area of curriculum and textbook
decisions. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 863 (1982). See also Epperson, 393 U.S.
at 104.
98. 753 F.2d at 1539. The Learning Tree, by Gordon Parks, is described by the court as
"a novel with autobiographic overtones . . . . [It deals with] central theme[s of] life, especially
• ..racism from the perspective of a teenage boy in a working class black family. Comment
on religion is a very minor portion of the book." Id. at 1534. Judge Canby states in his
concurrence that religious hypocrisy is one of the book's themes but that, although Jesus
Christ is described as a "poor white trash God" and the protagonist is led to doubt and
question simple pieties as "the good die young while the wicked prosper, prejudice reigns,
[and] the innocent suffer," these "are not new questions; Job asked them as well. Neither do
they reflect hostility toward religion." Id. at 1540-41 (Canby, J., concurring).
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v. Board of School Commissioners,99 the latest textbook challenge heard in
a federal court, did not even address the issue; both parties conceded a
secular purpose in the selection of the texts.100
One interesting twist on the issue is the assertion made by some school
and state authorities that the challengers themselves have the illegitimate
purpose. It has been alleged that "fundamentalists are using the issue of
secular humanism as a cover to force their own sectarian values on the
public schools."'' ° Given current Supreme Court doctrine, its application
by federal courts, and the watchdog stance being taken by commentators
both inside and outside of the education field, it appears that, absent a
serious blunder by the school administration,'02 objecting parents will have
to focus on something other than an alleged impermissible purpose on the
part of the government in order to win an establishment challenge.
An attack based on the effect prong will rarely succeed in the discrete
area of curriculum choice and text selection. The effect prong of the Lemon
test flags as a constitutional violation government action which advances
religion. 10 3 Justice O'Connor advocated modifying the effect test to render
unconstitutional any government action which "communicate[s] a message
of government endorsement or disapproval of religion . . .whether inten-
tionally or unintentionally" as perceived by the public in her concurring
opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly1°4 Although this statement of the test has
never been officially adopted by a majority of the Court, it is arguably the
appropriate standard 05 and it has been implemented in resolving a textbook
dispute by a federal appellate court.? 6
Results in curriculum and textbook cases that are decided on the effect
prong will be readily distinguishable from results in establishment clause
cases dealing with other aspects of public education. In establishment clause
analysis, the primary risk to be avoided is that the government action will
make students holding minority views feel alienated or pressured to
99. 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987).
100. Id. at 690. The court does indicate, however, that the school board's judgment that
the books were "more relevant," "better written," or "best suited [for some other nonreligious
reason]" would constitute a sufficiently legitimate secular purpose to satisfy the first prong of
the Lemon test. Id. at 694.
101. Woodward & Taylor, supra note 11, at 96. See also Park, The Religious Right and
Public Education, EDuc. LE.ADEasHn, May, 1987, at 5, 7; Developments in the Law: Religion
and the State, 100 HARv. L. Ray. 1606, 1670 (1987) [hereinafter Religion and the State].
102. See supra note 97. Compare the purpose analysis in Edwards, 108 S. Ct. at 2578-84,
with that in Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56-61.
103. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
104. 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring). One commentator has indicated that to
be a valid test, the message of endorsement or disapproval should be measured by the
perception of the minority group, rather than by the public at large. Religion and the State,
supra note 101, at 1648.
105. See Strossen, supra note 87, at 361-62.
106. See Smith, 827 F.2d at 692.
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conform 07-making "adherence to a religion relevant in any way" to their
standing in their community. 08 Prominent posting of the Ten Command-
ments in a classroom' °9 or opening the school day with prayer 10 or Bible
reading"' could clearly have the effect of conveying a message to students
that the school is presenting these doctrines and practices as ones that they
should or must follow. It is much less clear that the selection and use of
texts and materials which do not openly advocate or denounce religious
beliefs are subversively undermining traditional theism or establishing secular
humanism as a state religion. Moreover, the federal courts have been
unwilling to find constitutional injury in mere exposure to ideas that might
challenge children's religious commitments." 2 One of the express purposes
of public education is to prepare children to live in a pluralistic, tolerant
society. Despite the interest parents have in protecting the sectarian purity
of their children's education and socialization, the federal courts have
subordinated that interest to the values of the "melting pot."" 3
This reasoning is borne out in the Grove and Smith cases. Each court
tested the inclusion of the challenged books as either an advancement of
secular humanism or as an inhibition of traditional theism. Neither court
found an impermissible advancement of secular humanism, based on a
consideration of the way in which the challenged materials fit into the
context of the overall curriculum." 4 The Smith court found no impermissible
inhibition of religion based on a finding that the texts were not antagonistic
toward religion nor an attempt to discredit it' and that they were included
to instill "entirely appropriate" secular values such as logical decision-
making, self respect, and tolerance of diverse views." 6 A more interesting
example of judicial reasoning is the concurring opinion in Grove. While the
majority opinion disposed of the issue almost summarily, Judge Canby's
concurrence explained that although the challenged novel was, in fact,
derogatory toward religion generally, there was no unconstitutional inhibi-
tion of religion." 7 Canby explained the validity of the inclusion of the book
by saying that "to pose [ultimate] questions is not to impose answers."" 8
107. Strossen, supra note 87, at 359-60.
108. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
109. See Stone, 449 U.S. 39.
110. See Engel, 370 U.S. 421.
111. See Schempp, 374 U.S. 203.
112. See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1029 (1988). See also infra text accompanying notes 161-69.
113. See, e.g., Epperson, 393 U.S. at 107-08; Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1069; Grove, 753 F.2d
at 1539 (Canby, J., concurring).
114. Smith, 827 F.2d at 692; Grove, 753 F.2d at 1539.
115. Smith, 827 F.2d at 692.
116. Id.
117. Grove, 753 F.2d at 1540-41 (Canby, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 1541.
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Where the issue of values education is raised," 9 it appears that courts will
defer to the judgment of the local school boards until tle materials they
choose not only raise ultimate questions, but also give definitive answers.
To prevail in an establishment clause challenge, objecting parents will
have to make a strong showing that the challenged selections are in dero-
gation of religion and that they send a message of hostility toward religion
by their inclusion in the overall context of the curriculum. This demanding
interpretation of what constitutes an impermissible effect will protect public
education since plaintiffs must assert much more than merely subjective
conflict between their religious beliefs and the content of the curriculum
before a federal court will step in to review issues such as the system-wide
use of materials. The Smith court recognized the strain that would otherwise
be put on school officials in making curriculum and textbook decisions:
"If the standard were merely inconsistency with the beliefs of a particular
religion there would be very little that could be taught in the public
schools.' 20 Given the Supreme Court's inclination to look for some affir-
mative act in order to find a violation of the effect prong and the exacting
scrutiny to which federal courts are subjecting parental challenges to text-
books, an establishment clause claim based on an alleged effect prong
violation is not likely to be successful.
The entanglement prong of the Lemon test requires that the challenged
state action not involve excessive entanglement of government and religion.' 2'
To date, no establishment challenge to textbook choices has been based on
an alleged entanglement violation. Should such a challenge be brought and
succeed, the likely remedy would require that the board adopt texts and
materials that do not advance secular humanism nor inhibit traditional
theism or any other belief system. This remedy would probably be more
susceptible to an entanglement challenge than the practices currently under
fire since school systems would have to install some sort of administrative
process to evaluate which texts meet this requirement. Such an evaluation
system would itself constitute an entanglement violation since state education
119. The conflicting demands put on the public schools in the area of values education are
described most clearly by the assertion that teaching moral values can have the effect of
religious indoctrination, which schools must avoid, but that eradicating moral teaching "es-
tablish[es] a preference for those who believe in no morals," i.e., secular humanists. See
Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 20, at 19-20. This paradoxical situation leaves public schools
"caught in crossfire" between competing assertions that teaching values from either theistic
or from nontheistic views violates the first amendment. M. McCARnTY, supra note 33, at 33-
34. Judge Canby's concurrence in Grove asserts that for the establishment clause to have
meaning, there must be an area of "nonreligious" thought, rather than the "fallacious
dichotomy [of dividing] value laden thought into only two categories-the religious and the
anti-religious." Grove, 753 F.2d at 1536 (Canby, J., concurring). See also Establishment
Clause, supra note 20, at 1174-75.
120. Smith, 827 F.2d at 693 n.10.
121. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
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officials would have to decide whether a given set of beliefs constitutes a
religion in order to ensure adequate representation in the texts. 122
The ultimate first amendment claim based on an alleged establishment of
secular humanism will succeed or fail on the answer to the following
question: Is secular humanism a religion? 2 1 If it is a religion, secular
humanism clearly "has no more constitutional right to be taught in public
schools than the Protestant, Roman Catholic, or Jewish faiths." ,2A Its status
as a religion, non-religion, or anti-religion, however, has proven as elusive
as its definition.' 25 The Supreme Court has never made a definitive ruling
on the issue despite protests of some observers to the contrary.' 26 Lower
federal courts have, therefore, successfully evaded answering the question
to date "by holding that the beliefs, whatever their nature, were not being
established.' 27 So long as no case presents the issue squarely, courts can
continue to dispose of disputes without deciding whether secular humanism
is a religion or not. If secular humanism is ever found to be a religion,
and if the content of public education is found to constitute establishment
of secular humanism, the resulting purge of secular influence from curricula
and textbooks will leave Mr. Jefferson's wall' 28 in shambles, public education
122. In Aguilar, 473 U.S. 402, the Supreme Court invalidated a monitoring system installed
by a public school to try to save its student release time program from constitutional defect.
The Court found that the monitoring system itself "result[ed] in the excessive entanglement
of church and state." Id. at 409.
123. Giving a definitive answer to the question is clearly beyond the scope of this Note.
Two of the best known works on evaluating belief systems as religions are Choper, Defining
"Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 579, which suggests the presence
or absence of "ultimate concerns" and "extratemporal consequences" as determinative factors;
and Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REv. 752 (1984),
which advocates determining the status of questioned belief systems analogically "by seeing
how closely they resemble what is undeniably religious." Id. at 815.
Scholarly attempts to categorize secular humanism as a religion or not a religion include
Establishment Clause, supra note 20, at 1153-72, which uses two analogical standards, in
which secular humanism could be classified as a religion under the first, but not the second;
and Note, Secular Humanism as a Religion Within the Meaning of the First Amendment:
Grove v. Mead School Dist., 61 TUL. L. REv. 453 (1986), which uses Supreme Court precedent
and the challenger's claim in Grove as criteria, ultimately concluding that no meaningful
determination can be made.
124. Woodward & Taylor, supra note 11, at 96.
125. See supra note 20. See also Park, supra note 101, at 7. ("[The term has strength in
its confusion. It has become a useful label for everything leaders in the religious right consider
evil or godless.")
126. Fundamentalists claim that the inclusion of secular humanism in a Supreme Court
footnote in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 489 n.11 (1961), that lists "religions in this
country which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of
God," constitutes a definitive holding that classifies it as a religion under establishment clause
doctrine. But see supra note 20.
127. Establishment Clause, supra note 20, at 1156.
128. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 ("In the words of Jefferson, the clause against the establishment
of religion by law was intended to erect a 'wall of separation between church and state."'
(quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
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in chaos, and sectarian factionalism running amok. However, the federal
courts, with perhaps one exception, 29 are aware of what is at stake and
will undoubtedly continue to avoid the issue by refusing to determine the
status of secular humanism.
B. Free Exercise Challenge
It can be predicted that a free exercise challenge to curriculum and
textbook decisions is more likely to succeed than a claim based on an
alleged violation of the establishment clause. Courts are more amenable to
the individualized remedies available in a successful free exercise suit than
to the system-wide purge that rectifying an establishment clause violation
would require. 30 However, the most recent federal decision in this area,
Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education,' indicates that in order
to prevail, objecting parents will have to show with a high degree of
specificity how the challenged materials burden their religious freedoms.1
2
It is instructive to look at the analyses employed in the Mozert decisions at
both the court of appeals 33 and district court 34 levels.
The controversy in Mozert arose when a group of parents voiced objec-
tions to the texts adopted by the Hawkins County schools. Initial requests
by the parents for the substitution of texts for their children and the
exclusion of their children from class discussion of the objectionable ma-
terials were granted in three Hawkins County schools. The parents submitted
a petition to a fourth school for similar accomodations 35 and for removal
of the adopted series from the entire school system. 36 The school board
denied the petition and terminated the accommodations that had been made
after the initial requests. 37 Thereafter, the objecting students refused to
attend classes or complete assignments, and were suspended as a result. The
parents withdrew many of the students from the Hawkins County public
school system and enrolled them in private schools. Suit was instituted
129. See Judge Brevard Hand's opinion in Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 655 F.
Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala.), rev'd 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987).
130. See generally Religion and the State, supra note 101, at 1705-22 (discussing the Court's
recognition of a wide variety of individual accommodations under the free exercise clause).
The author also discusses the tension such accommodations create under a strict interpretation
of the establishment clause and notes a failure on the part of the Court to "develop a
principled basis for choosing which free exercise claimants to accommodate." Id. at 1712-13.
131. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1029 (1988).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub. Schools, 647 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), rev'd
sub nom. Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, cert. denied 108 S. Ct.
1029 (1988).
135. Mozert, 647 F. Supp. at 1196-97.
136. Jurenas, supra note 19, at 28.
137. Mozert, 647 F. Supp. at 1196-97.
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based on an alleged violation of the first amendment right to free exercise
of religion under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.138
With the exception of the district court's award of damages, 39 the district
court and the court of appeals reached identical conclusions on how parents
could protect their children from texts described as "so inimical" to their
religious views that mere exposure would be harmful.140 Both courts found
that removal of the children from public school was the appropriate remedy
for the parents' concerns. The critical difference, however, is each court's
view of the nature of that remedy. The district court felt that private or
home schooling should be judicially mandated to relieve an unconstitutional
burden on the plaintiffs' free exercise rights.1 4' The court of appeals found
no constitutional violation and stated that private and home schooling were
statutorily authorized options available to parents who wished to shield their
children from "exposure to some ideas they find offensive."' 42 The court
of appeals freed the school system of its damages liability, which indicates
that "[iun religion . . . government has no general duty to subsidize the
exercise of constitutional rights."' 43 While parents may have their children
educated somewhere other than in public schools, the financial burden of
that choice rests with the parents, not with the school system.
The key to assessing the two decisions is to understand the principles
underlying a free exercise challenge and to recognize how each court
characterized the case's facts when applying those principles. The Supreme
Court has indicated that individual religious liberty will be protected, stating
that "[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in...
religion . . . or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.' 14"
In evaluating free exercise claims, the Supreme Court has developed a test
designed to assess whether a particular governmental action has impermis-
sibly attempted to prescribe orthodoxy and coerce adherence to its strictures.
This test was most recently stated in Thomas v. Review Board.4 Under
Thomas, if the state conditions the receipt of a benefit' 46 on conduct
proscribed by religious belief, or denies a benefit because of conduct required
by a religious belief, a burden on the free exercise of religion exists. 47 In
138. Id.
139. The district court awarded over $51,000 in damages to the plaintiff parents to defray
the costs of enrolling their children in private church schools and pursuing the suit. Mozert,
827 F.2d at 1063.
140. Reidinger, "If Thy Textbook Offends Thee . A.B.A. J., Jan. 1, 1987, at 78.
141. Mozert, 647 F. Supp. at 1203.
142. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1067.
143. L. TRIBE, Am:ERicAN CoNsnrrnoNA LAW 1275 (2d ed. 1988).
144. Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
145. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
146. In this context, the benefit at issue is the provision of a public education.
147. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18.
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order to assert a free exercise claim, a person objecting to a governmental
regulation must first show that his beliefs are sincerely held and are of a
religious nature, and that the challenged regulations act to inhibit the practice
of his religion. 48 Once the religious objector has made such a showing, the
burden shifts to the state to show that the regulation is the least restrictive
means of pursuing a compelling state interest. 49
Both courts and all parties in Mozert agreed that the parents asserted
sincerely held beliefs rooted in religion 50 and that the state had a compelling
interest in the education of its young citizens.' The courts and the parties
did not agree, however, on the characterization of the state's requirement
of a compulsory uniform reading program, leading to a split in the results.
The characterization of requiring students enrolled in public schools to
attend class, read from the adopted and assigned texts, and participate-at
least by listening-to class discussion was the determinative factor in each
decision.5 2 Neither court's decision is a fully satisfactory guide for future
litigation. Arguably, the district court's analysis gives too much latitude to
the religious objector, while the court of appeals may have substituted legal
semantics for an empathetic evaluation of the undeniably real effects that
the regulation had on the objectors.
The district court seems to have applied a mechanical syllogism to find
that the parents' religious beliefs had been burdened. The parties stipulated
that the plaintiff's beliefs were both religious and sincerely held and that
certain materials in the textbooks were offensive to them.153 The court then
reasoned that since the board's resolution to use only state adopted books
ran afoul of the parents' belief that they must shield their children from
exposure to the texts, the uniform reading requirement constituted a burden
on the plaintiffs' free exercise rights. 54 The court noted the home schooling
statutes and the alternative programs that the school provided prior to the
suit and concluded that the "state [could] achieve literacy and good citizen-
ship for all students without forcing them to read the [challenged texts]."' 55
148. Id. Both Mozert courts rejected the state's assertion that the belief being burdened
must be a "central" or "fundamental" tenet of the religion to sustain a free exercise challenge.
One commentator, however, has noted that "at least . . . some analysis of the relative
doctrinal importance of a plaintiff's religious objection or practice is appropriate ...for
judging free exercise claims." Recent Developments-Constitutional Law: The Free Exercise
Clause and Compulsory Reading in Public Schools-Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools,
10 HARV. J.L. & PUBL. PoL'Y 768, 771 (1987) [hereinafter Free Exercise Clause].
149. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18.
150. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1061; Mozert, 647 F. Supp. at 1197.
151. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1068; Mozert, 647 F. Supp. at 1200.
152. Current free exercise doctrine has been criticized as being "excessively malleable" in
that the interests of either the individual or the state can be highlighted by the court to justify
whatever result it has reached. Religion and the State, supra note 101, at 1708.
153. Mozert, 647 F. Supp. at 1197.
154. Id. at 1200.
155. Id. at 1201.
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On the surface, this analysis is appealing. The result seems to be a
reasonable application of the Thomas test and is very solicitous of the rights
of the individual. However, the analysis poses serious problems for future
litigation. First, it would be ill-advised for any state to stipulate to the
sincerity or religiosity of beliefs or to the offensiveness of the contested
materials to those beliefs given the mechanical, checklist-style analysis that
the district court employed: Sincere religious beliefs + Offensiveness +
Requirement to read + School's refusal/inability to implement sufficiently
less restrictive alternatives = Unconstitutional burden mandating judicially
enforced accommodation. Instead of stipulating to facilitate proceedings,
the state would be forced to contest these issues, and courts would be
forced to make much more detailed inquiries into the sources and depths
of the beliefs. This kind of inquiry could implicate entanglement concerns
under the establishment clause. 56
A second weakness in the district court's analysis is its contradictory
handling of the state's claim that the uniform reading program was the
least restrictive means of achieving its compelling interest. The state asserted
that, given the objections the parents raised concerning the texts, it would
be impossible for the board to select another series that they would find
suitable. The court dispensed with this argument by stating that since the
parents had not raised "multi-subject, multi-text objections . . . [t]he
defendants may not justify burdening the plaintiffs' free exercise rights in
this narrow case on the basis of what the plaintiffs might find objectionable
in the future."' 5 7 In fashioning its remedy, however, the court explicitly
cites the unlikelihood that any "single, secular reading series on the state's
approved list would be acceptable to the plaintiffs without modifications '""
as a reason to mandate a publicly financed home or private schooling
accommodation. Both the school system and the court decided that these
children must attend either private or home schools in order to be educated
according to the requirements of their state and within the strictures of
their religion. It is inconsistent, therefore, for the court to refuse to allow
the state to base its decision on the parents' broad objections to state-
adopted materials and then to rest its own decision on those very same
objections.
The district court's holding has potential for abuse as a bargaining tool.
Fundamentalist parents could use this precedent to exert excessive leverage
in negotiating with school boards on the selection of other texts and materials
that are potentially objectionable. 5 9 School boards might react to this
156. L. TRIBE, supra note 143, at 1246-47. See also supra notes 122-23 and accompanying
text.
157. Mozert, 647 F. Supp. at 1201.
158. Id. at 1203.
159. Free Exercise Clause, supra note 148, at 772.
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holding by conceding to pressure groups and adopting "inoffensive" books
rather than face the possibility of an extended suit and an exorbitant damage
award. This effective veto power could give religious objectors the potential
to shape the school's curriculum to a single creed. 160 The free exercise clause
is a constitutional defense to over-intrusive regulation by the government.
It is not a doctrine which can legitimately be used offensively to effect
systemic changes. The .decision of the district court, while superficially more
protective of individual liberty, is also broad enough to be open to abuse.
The court of appeals never reached the question of whether the uniform
reading program was justified as the least restrictive means of-achieving
legitimate state goals. According to the court, the evidentiary burden never
shifted to the state to make this showing because the "plaintiffs failed to
establish the existence of an unconstitutional burden." 161 This finding was
based on the court's characterization of the two forms an unconstitutional
burden may take: compelling a student to make an affirmance or denial of
his beliefs, or requiring a student to participate in activities contrary to his
beliefs. 62 According to the court, compliance with the board's policy sub-
jected students to neither of the prohibited forms of coercion.
All students were required to read assignments from texts adopted from
the state-approved list and to participate, at least by listening or observing,
in class discussions or activities. 63 Since an objecting child was forced
neither to profess or deny any belief nor to actually take part in the
activities, the court found the element of coercion to be missing. 64 The
160. Religion and the State, supra note 101, at 1670.
161. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1070. In a thinly veiled criticism of the lower court's decision,
Judge Lively said that "when asked to 'interpose,' courts must examine the record very
carefully to make certain that a constitutional violation has occurred before they order changes
in an educational program adopted by duly chosen local officials." Id.
162. Id. The most well-known examples of such unconstitutional regulations are those
requiring student participation in flag salute and school prayer, which the Court has consistently
struck down since 1943. See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. 38; Engel, 370 U.S. 421; Barnette, 319
U.S. 624.
163. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1069.
164. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1063-68. Some of the particular materials and activities which the
parents asserted to be unconstitutional burdens, and which the appellate court found to be
noncoercive, included textual references to evolution, magic, and achievements by women
outside the home, and engaging in role playing, haggling, and making up chants. Id. at 1062,
1066. A poem called "Look at Anything," with a theme that one can use the imagination to
"become" a thing and thus understand it better, was objectionable because it is "'occult
practice' for children to use imagination beyond the limitation of scriptural authority." Id. at
1062. A passage in a first grade text was found to be objectionable because it allegedly
indoctrinated children in the tenets of secular humanism. The story depicted a boy cooking
while a girl read. The objecting parent claimed that "the religion of John Dewey is planted
in the first graders [sic] mind that there are no God-given roles for the different sexes."
Strossen, supra note 87, at 340 n.44 (quoting a letter from Bob Mozert, one of the named
plaintiffs, to the editor of the Kingsport, Tenn. Times (Oct. 18, 1983)).
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absence of coercion, an element not mentioned in the district court's burden
equation, was found to be determinative by the court of appeals.'
6 5
The court of appeals made a distinction between the constitutional guar-
antee of free exercise of religion-which the court defined as freedom from
compulsion to speak or to act contrary to one's religious beliefs-and what
it saw as the parents' claim-a guarantee of freedom from exposure to
ideas they found offensive to their religion. The court quoted Judge Canby's
concurrence in Grove v. Mead School District No. 354,'66 saying that
"governmental actions that merely offend or cast doubt on religious beliefs
do not on that account violate free exercise."' 6 7 This is consistent with
Supreme Court doctrine. Writing for the majority in Epperson v. Arkan-
sas,'6 1 Justice Fortas stated that there is no legitimate state interest in
protecting the adherants of particular religions from views "distasteful to
them." 169 While Epperson dealt with a statute regulating the teaching of
evolution, the same reasoning is equally applicable to themes found in texts
other than science books. Since evolution is taught openly as a scientific
theory, while secular humanism is allegedly purveyed in other courses on a
more subliminal level, validating textbook choices by finding no constitu-
tional guarantee of freedom from exposure is either obvious or insidious,
depending on one's stance.
The court of appeals decision is troubling. While it seems reasonable to
say objectively that exposure to texts and discussions does not constitute
coercion, the Supreme Court has recognized that "mere exposure" to
majoritarian practices in the classroom, as in the contexts of school prayer 70
and ritual flag salute, 7 can have a coercive impact sufficient to warrant
constitutional protection. In the Sixth Circuit's Mozert decision, the subjec-
tive impact on the religious objectors is seemingly not taken into account.
The result is that the majority is willing to turn its back on an injury that
165. This finding, however, may not withstand close examination. Students who are not
allowed to absent themselves during the discussion of materials contrary to their religious
beliefs arguably are being passively coerced into acceptance of mainstream philosophy. Forced
exposure to these kinds of activities are virtually indistinguishable from forced participation
in or exposure to the flag salute and prayer recitation activities which the Court has consistently
found to impose an unconstitutional burden of individual religious beliefs. See supra note 162
and accompanying text.
166. 753 F.2d 1528, 1535 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985).
167. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1068 (quoting Grove, 753 F.2d at 1543 (Canby, J., concurring)).
168. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
169. Id. at 107 (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505 (1952)). See
also Will, Tailored Textbooks, Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 1986, at H7, col. 1. (The free exercise
clause "is not . . a commitment to protect parents and children from influences that might
complicate the transmission of sectarian beliefs." (quoted in L. TRIBE, supra note 143, at
1275.)).
170. See Wallace, 472 U.S. 38; Engel, 370 U.S. 421.
171. See Barnette, 319 U.S. 624.
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merits constitutional consideration simply because, on the balance, the
remedy sought by these particular plaintiffs was not appropriate.
Judge Boggs, who concurred only in the result, has the plight of the
plaintiffs in better focus. He describes their burden as "many years of
education, being required to study books that . . . systematically under-
value, contradict and ignore their religion."' These plaintiffs maintained
that they would keep their children in the public schools only if following
discussion of the offending topics, their children were instructed that the
"other views are incorrect and that the plaintiffs' views are the correct
ones."' 73 Given this extreme position, the court of appeals clearly could not
accommodate these plaintiffs within the forum of the public schools without
running afoul of the establishment clause. 74 There will undoubtedly arise,
however, challenges by religious objectors whose views are not so extreme
and whose proposed remedies will pose less of a threat to the integrity of
public education. 75 The danger in these borderline cases is that the appellate
decision could be applied as mechanically as that of the district court. The
risk that one party's interest will be subjugated without proper evaluation
is precisely the same. The difference is that under the court of appeals'
analysis, the individual's rights will bow to pursuance of state interests.
In spite of the foregoing criticism, the court of appeals decision is
preferable to that of the district court because it more clearly recognizes
the dilemma faced by public schools and more accurately describes the goals
of public values education. Public schools are expected to be the inculcators
172. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1079 (Boggs, J., concurring).
173. Id. at 1062.
174. Any exemption from state regulation opens establishment clause questions as to whether
the exemption is an impermissible preference, advancement, or endorsement of the beliefs
being accommodated. There is no easy resolution to this concern. Justice O'Connor believes
that exemptions which act to relieve a state-imposed burden are justifiable as free exercise
"modifications" of the establishment clause. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 83 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring). Some believe that free exercise exemptions should be the rule, with denials of exemptions
allowed only when the government's interest is very high. McConnell, Neutrality Under the
Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U.L. REv. 146, 153 (1986). Others, however, warn that such an
accommodation might still violate the establishment clause if it seemed to prefer among
religions, or was costly or "hamper[ed] school authorities' ability to carry out their functions."
Religion and the State, supra note 101, at 1666 n.129. One commentator would find a judicially
created exemption preferable to one created by statute. He believes that judicial decisions "do
not ordinarily threaten the intrusion of religious life into the secular sphere" while legislative
exemptions promote inequality by accommodating some, but not all, legitimate objectors. Id.
at 1731, 1738. Another commentator asserts that the legislature may be in a better position
than the courts to decide when the "advantages of strict neutrality are overstated." L. TRmE,
supra note 143, at 1194-95. Case-by-case consideration and determination seems more congruent
with the spirit of the free exercise clause, but the development of some statutory guidance is
probably preferable to ad hoc decision-making by the bench.
175. See McConnell, supra note 174, at 148 ("[A]s society becomes ever more secular, many
more persons of varying religious persuasions (even the 'religious right') will require 'special
treatment' in order to remain faithful to their religious tenets.").
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of values "essential to a democratic society,' 76 while remaining faithful to
the strictures of the establishment clause. Among these desired values is a
"tolerance of divergent political and religious views.' 1 77 The court of appeals
makes an important distinction when it describes the tolerance promoted in
the challenged textbook series as being civil in nature rather than religious.
7 8
In a pluralistic society, one may be free to privately consider another
morally damned, but no one is free to use the organs of the state to force
his own salvation on that other. The cost of pluralism, however, appears
to be that religious beliefs sincerely held by some sects will be burdened to
an uncomfortable degree, either through the exposure to conflicting ideas
or through the added costs of providing private education.
It is particularly important to foster civil tolerance in children who are
expected to become members of society at large. The court of appeals
distinguished Wisconsin v. Yoder,179 where children of Old Order Amish
parents were exempted from state compulsory schooling laws, by pointing
to the long history of separateness of the Amish culture. The Mozert parents
differed from the Yoder parents in that they wanted their children to
"acquire all the skills required to live in modern society."' 80 In today's
American culture one of those skills certainly must be to recognize and
tolerate a diversity of views.
One commentator recommends that to facilitate civil tolerance, public
schools should "encourage as wide a range of views to be presented and
expounded as is practical, and to avoid when possible an authoritative
position on issues known to be controversial.' 8 This teaching method,
however, has been subject to condemnation by fundamentalists as promoting
moral relativism. 82 The court of appeals decision could protect public
schools from being molded to the demands of sectarian factions and,
through various opt-out alternatives, simultaneously afford the religious
adherent the latitude to be educated according to the tenets of his faith and
the requirements of his state.
Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education is the latest word from
federal appellate courts on fundamentalist challenges to textbook choices. 83
Although the Sixth Circuit requires a relatively substantial showing of a
burden in order to prevail in a free exercise challenge, such a challenge is
more likely to be successful than one based on the establishment clause. A
free exercise action seeking a narrowly tailored remedy has a better prospect
176. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
177. Id.
178. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1069.
179. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
180. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1067.
181. McConnell, supra note 174, at 165.
182. Religion and the State, supra note 101, at 1671. See also supra note 76.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 130-75.
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than one that seeks a broad remedy. First, since local school boards have
a great deal of discretion in setting curriculum, an individualized accom-
modation will be favored over systemic change.184 Second, the focus of the
inquiry will be on the challenger's beliefs and how the materials, regardless
of their nature, affect those beliefs. 1s5 Courts, therefore, will be able to
escape the decision that an establishment challenge will entail: deciding
whether or not secular humanism is a religion. Third, much of the machinery
is already in place to make a free exercise remedy easily available to parents
and not overly burdensome to schools. All states currently have private and
home schooling options, s6 and if supplemental materials are available,
substitution and exclusion options might also be implemented to accom-
modate minority beliefs.8 7 Finally, given the highly individualized nature of
religious beliefs and given the institutional nature of public schools and
their difficulty in providing tailored instruction, a free exercise challenge
seems more congruent with the complaints of parents concerning the edu-
cation of their children. While it is entirely appropriate for a parent to
want to control the development of his own child, it is inappropriate for a
parent to presume to do so for someone else's child.
III. Por ncAL REMEDIES
Hypothetical 3: The judicial challenges brought by the parents are un-
successful because the court rendering the decision follows the reasoning of
the Eleventh Circuit decision in Smith v. Board of School Commissioners
to dismiss the establishment challenge and applies the coercion standard
adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of
Education to find no unconstitutional burden on their free exercise rights.
The parents, still aggrieved by the requirements of the board's decisions,
look to another forum for relief-the political process.
The parents have two opportunities for effecting change via the political
system. First, they can lobby the state legislature to add provisions to the
state's education code to require adequate representation of their views in
school curricula. Second, they can focus on making changes locally by
electing representatives to the school board which chooses the texts and
184. M. McCArTHY, supra note 33, at 63 (asserting that requests for exemptions are often
not honored where they disrupt the operation of the school or interfere with the students'
educational progress).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 161-69.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 47-56.
187. One commentator warns, however, that substitution and exclusion give students the
choice of participating or waiting elsewhere, which "implies that the [objectionable] exercise
is a valid element of a legally required education; the norm is religion and dissenters must opt
out." L. TRmE, supra note 143, at 1170.
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materials that will be used in the particular school in which their children
are enrolled.
A. State Legislation
Religiously motivated efforts to enact state-wide legislation concerning
the curriculum in public schools are most commonly limited to disputes
about instruction on the origins of man.""8 More specifically, the statutes
focus on the presence or absence of evolution and creationism in science
curricula. Many fundamentalists view evolution as being in diametric op-
position to their religious beliefs, and therefore seek its eradication from
public education.
One such effort was the Arkansas statute which was the source of
controversy in Epperson v. Arkansas.' 9 Under this statute, instruction on
evolution subjected the teacher to criminal charges and dismissal. The
Supreme Court invalidated the statute as a violation of the establishment
clause, stating that "the First Amendment does not permit the State to
require that teaching and learning be tailored to the principles or prohibitions
of any religious sect."' 19 While Epperson closed the door on seeking a
complete prohibition of the teaching of evolution, it did not close the door
on less extreme provisions.
Since the Epperson era, proposed enactments typically legislate the inclu-
sion of instruction on creationism rather than exclusion of the instruction
on evolution. These provisions are commonly called "balanced treatment"
or "equal treatment" acts since they advocate the presentation of both
theories. Proponents urge adoption of the statutes, asserting that students'
academic freedom is restricted by being presented with only one theory on
man's origin.' 9' The societal value of pluralism, they say, will be promoted
by allowing diverse views to be voiced in the classroom. 92
188. While evolution-creation statutes are by far the most common, other efforts to legislate
religiously-based theories into public education have been documented. One suggested provision,
dating from the 1920s, would have "prescribe[d] by law that pi should be changed from
3.1416 to 3.000 . . .partly because the Bible described Solomon's vase as three times as far
around as across." D. NELKIN, THE CREATION CONTROVERSY 31 (1982). An issue which is
receiving increasing legislative attention is whether schools can constitutionally be required to
make their facilities available for religiously oriented student groups. See generally Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that a state university which has opened a forum
generally to student groups cannot exclude a religious group); Bender v. Williamsport Area
School Dist., 475 U.S. 534 (1986) (presenting the same question as Widmar applied at the
high school level; while the case was disposed without reaching the merits, four Justices
indicated that they would have found Widmar controlling). See also Teitel, When Separate is
Equal: Why Organized Religious Exercises, Unlike Chess, Do Not Belong In Public Schools,
81 Nw. U.L. REv. 174 (1986).
189. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
190. Id. at 106.
191. M. McCARTHY, supra note 33, at 82.
192. D. NELKN, supra note 188, at 178-79.
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Opponents of creation science focus upon its religious basis to justify
keeping it out of the public schools. Creationists maintain that the Genesis
account of the origins of man is "an alternative scientific hypothesis capable
of evaluation by scientific procedures" rather than religious dogma. 9 3 Their
opponents counter by charging creationists with attempting to characterize
a religious philosophy as an empirical science' 94 and with trying to "dilute
the theory of evolution to the level of hypothesis or speculation and to win
equal time for the doctrine of special creation."'' 9 Under current establish-
ment clause doctrine, 96 opponents of creationism have the advantage so
long as they can convince reviewing courts that balanced treatment statutes
are religiously based and motivated.
Creationists believe that legislation can be drafted which will ensure fair
coverage of creation theory within the bounds of the establishment clause.
Wendell Bird, a Yale law graduate previously affiliated with the Institute
for Creation Research, has asserted that teaching creationism need not
violate the establishment clause, but that not teaching it violates the free
exercise rights of creationist students. 97 He drafted a model resolution
designed to adhere to the strictures of the first amendment by "sharply
distinguishing" scientific creationism, which is based on scientific evidence,
and religious creationism, which is based on Biblical doctrine.' 8 Bird's
model was the basis for the statute around which the latest Supreme Court
ruling on this question centers.
Edwards v. Aguillard99 involved an establishment clause challenge brought
by Louisiana teachers, religious leaders, and parents of school children
against the state's "Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-
193. Id. at 72-73. For a discussion on how creationism is explained as a scientific theory
without reference to religious doctrine, see Comment, Evolution and Creationism in the Public
Schools, 9 J. CoNTEmp. L. 81, 99-105 (1983).
194. Indiana adopted a biology text which included only creationism to be used in con-
junction with texts presenting evolution. One school system adopted only the creationist text.
In the ensuing litigation, an Indianapolis trial judge found the creationist text unconstitutional
no matter how used. "[It is a] transparent attempt to clothe the Genesis account in scientific
garb." E. LARSON, Tu.41 AND ERROR 144-45 (1985).
195. Id. at 126 (quoting University of Tennessee Law Professor Frederic S. Le Clercq on
the revival of "monkey laws"). The "dilution" being referred to is an example of the
concessions made by textbook publishers in order to keep their products salable. See supra
note 11. Many science texts precede chapters on evolution with a disclaimer that it is only
"hypothesis" or "one of several explanations." Many fundamentalists do not think such
prefacing does enough to neutralize the potential harm that exposure could do to their children.
See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1062 (6th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 1029 (1988).
196. See supra notes 81-121 and accompanying text.
197. E. LARSON, supra note 194, at 148.
198. D. NELYIN, supra note 188, at 99-100.
199. 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
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Science in Public School Instruction Act." The Court applied the test
enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman201 and found the statute unconstitutional
as a violation of its purpose prong. 202 The Court put a great deal of
emphasis on the Act's legislative history and the subsequent testimony of
its sponsor. 20
The Court stated that in order to pass the purpose prong, the state's
asserted secular purpose must be "sincere and not a sham.' '2 4 The govern-
ment's proffered purpose of promoting academic freedom was found to be
a cover for its primary purpose of "chang[ing] the science curriculum of
public schools in order" to provide persuasive advantage to a particular
religious doctrine.' '205 After the initiation of the litigation, the state argued
that the legislature's use of the term "academic freedom" meant the "basic
concept of fairness, teaching of all the evidence" rather than "the correct
legal sense" of the phrase. 206 Even given this latitude in defining its secular
purpose, the state was unable to justify its statute.
First, the statute on its face did not purport to offer "all the evidence"
on the origins of man, only that evidence involving evolution and creation
science. Second, the Court suggested that outlawing evolution or requiring
creationism did not act to expand the scope of a science curriculum. 207
Third, the Act provided that curriculum guides and research services were
to be developed and supplied for creation science but not for evolution,
and that protections were to be afforded to one "choos[ing] to be a creation-
scientist," but not to one who chose to teach evolution or refused to teach
creationism. 2°8 The Court considered these provisions to belie the sincerity
of the government's stated purpose of ensuring fair coverage of both
theories.
As an application of the Lemon test, Edwards is clearly sound. Viewed
within the context of the other textbook controversies, however, the case
raises two concerns. The first is the apparent inconsistency between what
200. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.1 to .7 (West 1982). Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority, stated the substance of the act as follows: "The creationism act forbids the teaching
of the theory of evolution in public schools unless accompanied by instruction in 'creation
science.' No school is required to teach . . . [either; if one] is taught, however, the other
must be taught." Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2575-76 (citation omitted).
201. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See also supra text accompanying notes 83-121.
202. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2576. Since the Louisiana act was found to violate the purpose
prong of the Lemon test, no consideration was given to how the act would fare under the
effect or entanglement prongs.
203. Id. at 2579-83.
204. Id. at 2579. This statement of the purpose prong intensified the scrutiny of governmental
purpose, which cases following the test's inception had seemingly relaxed. See supra text
accompanying notes 91-97.
205. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2582.
206. Id. at 2579.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 2579-80.
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the Court says a teacher may do and what would happen under current
establishment clause doctrine should the teacher do it. The Court states that
prior to the enactment of the creationism act, teachers had the flexibility
to "supplant the present science curriculum with the presentation of theories,
besides evolution, about the origin of life." 209 This would be an accurate
statement until a parent protested that her child was being subjected to
religious indoctrination. If litigation ensued, the teacher's supplemental
instruction would be tested under Lemon and would likely fail the effect
prong of the test since a teacher's unilateral decision to include instruction
on religious theories could, arguably, "communicat[e] a message of govern-
mental endorsement. . . whether intentionally or unintentionally. ' '210
The second concern is the more serious: How legitimate can the process
be if the fundamentalists always lose? In Smith v. Board of School
Commissioners21 1 and Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education,212
state and education officials prevailed. In Edwards, the fundamentalists had
amassed sufficient political clout to become the voice of the state through
its legislation, and still they lost. Perhaps the distinction is the degree to
which the content of the adopted measure is obviously religious. In the
textbook cases, the charge against the materials was that they advanced
secular humanism. As yet, there has been no definitive resolution about
secular humanism's status as a religion. 2 3 And given the sweeping condem-
nation of adopted materials and the difficulty in predicting what will offend
next, courts may be best advised to err on the side of protecting the
institution of public education while ensuring an escape mechanism for the
dissenter. Creation science, however, is unambiguously the product of the
tenets of certain religions. No matter how it is packaged, a balanced
treatment statute is legislating religion into the public school classroom,
which is as blatant and intolerable a violation of the establishment clause
as opening the school day with a teacher-led, school-prescribed prayer.21 4
The ultimate results that adoption and implementation of such a statute
might yield must also be considered. If balanced treatment really means
equal time and emphasis, some educators fear that a decline in scientific
achievement will result if teachers are not allowed to indicate to students
209. Id. at 2579.
210. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also
supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
211. 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987).
212. 827 F.2d 1058.
213. See supra note 20.
214. Such a prayer was found to be an establishment clause violation in Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962). Proponents of creation science, however, could persuasively argue that
the finding in Mozert that "mere exposure" to conflicting beliefs does not give rise to a
constitutional injury should be equally applicable where it is the beliefs of the minority that
are being given exposure. See supra text accompanying notes 161-69.
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which theory is better supported by scientific data or has better predictive
capabilities. 2 5 Others fear that academic freedom, in its "correct legal
sense," will be destroyed. A federal district court in 1982 invoked the
protection of academic freedom as one reason to invalidate an Arkansas
balanced treatment statute. The court warned that students could be denied
a significant part of their education because teachers might forego teaching
subjects thought to be "important to a proper presentation of a course" if
such instruction would trigger the requirement of teaching other material
"which they do not consider academically sound.''216 Most importantly,
implementation of balanced treatment statutes may not be the end of the
problem for state education officials. Since the accommodation afforded by
such statutes "promotes the religious freedom only of those whose beliefs
are incorporated into the curriculum, ' 2 17 it is reasonable to predict that
adherents to other views can and will clamor to get their views incorporated
as well.
Despite the consistent move of the courts to invalidate balanced treatment
statutes, it is unlikely that efforts to draft an act that will pass constitutional
muster will end. Bill Keith, the sponsor of the doomed Louisiana statute,
has said that "[a]s long as you have people in this country who favor
something, then it will never die. '218 Parents who wish to see changes
effected more immediately and with less likelihood of judicial invalidation,
however, may choose to exert their influence on local, rather than state,
decision-makers.
B. Local School Board
Hypothetical 4: The parents decide that in the wake of Edwards v.
Aguillard pursuing the adoption of state legislation would be futile. The
parents focus their attention on gaining control of the local school board.
Their goal is to use the administrative machinery responsible for the burdens
placed on their religious beliefs to alleviate those burdens. The parents
organize a campaign to elect members of their group to the local school
board, the administrative body that sets school policy and gives final
approval for all curricular decisions. In the ensuing election, a number of
members of the former board are defeated. The new board now has the
majority of its seats filled by members of the parent group.
Issues concerning public schools are common sources for heated political
controversy. Most citizens are aware of events and concerns arising in their
215. D. NELKIN, supra note 188, at 173-77.
216. McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
217. Religion and the State, supra note 101, at 1673.
218. Reuben, Justices Reject Creation-Science in Public Schools, L.A. Daily J., June 22,
1987, at 1, 26, col. 6.
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local schools whether or not they have children enrolled. Of particular
interest is how schools are operating in their capacity as inculcators of
societal values, and "parent community groups, or self-appointed textbook-
watchers contest changes in the substance or methods of teaching that
violate their perceptions about the values to be conveyed to young citi-
zens." 219 Parents with religious reservations about school matters, particu-
larly in the creationism-evolution context, have exerted considerable influence
on school decisions through community pressure.220 In recent years, fun-
damentalist parent groups have increasingly organized themselves into ef-
fective political units to bring about changes in public schools that they see
as necessary.
Gaining control of the local school board can be an effective way for
fundamentalist parents to make pervasive changes in the school system.
Once board members who represent their interests are in the majority,
textbook and curricular proposals will have to meet their standards in order
to be adopted. Fundamentalist leaders are fully aware of the power wielded
by local boards and how attaining that power could further their interests.
Robert L. Simmonds, Director of Citizens for Excellence in Education and
the National Association of Christian Educators, has been quoted as follows:
"When we get an active Christian parents' committee in operation in all
districts, we can take complete control of all local school boards. This
would allow us to determine all local policy; select good textbooks, good
curriculum programs; superintendents and principals. Our time has come!"' 21
The political climate surrounding local school board elections is reactive,
and a community concerned about the moral standards of its young people
is likely to be responsive to candidates who seem to share those concerns
and who have an affirmative plan to make changes. As fundamentalist
groups become more politically effective, 222 the curricular decisions of local
school boards may increasingly reflect their views.
*219. D. NELKIN, supra note 188, at 57.
220. Id. at 157. Although Nelkin notes that local efforts are typically more successful than
those aimed at state legislatures, there is evidence that state officials also feel considerable
pressure. A member of the Arkansas state legislature which passed a balanced treatment statute
in 1981 stated that "[the act] is a terrible bill . . . but it's worded so cleverly that none of
us can vote against it if we want to come back up here." E. LAtsoN, supra note 194, at 152.
221. Molnar, The Issue at Hand: Religious Challenges to Public Schools, EDUC. LAnaDERSm',
May, 1987, at 4.
222. Parents with religious objection to public school curriculum decisions are urged to
organize into pressure groups in order to bring about the changes they desire. The author of
one book on the current "crisis" in public schools offers parents advice on how to effectively
approach school officials with objections to texts and activities. See generally CLASsROOMs IN
Ciusis, supra note 6, at 127-57. Once initial efforts are rebuffed, the authors advise gaining
influence in the community by organizing mass visits to classrooms, arranging confrontative
conferences and airing negative reports about the school-in other words, keying on the
vulnerability of those who depend on public approval in order to keep their programs funded
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Virtually every judicial decision concerning public schools refers to the
broad grant of discretion that is accorded the local school board in making
curriculum decisions and in setting educational policy. 223 This grant is said
to reflect such traditions and concerns as "preserving local democratic
control over educational policy; protecting teachers' academic freedom; and
maintaining policies that comport with the views of educational experts."2'
The Supreme Court has confirmed the continuing validity of this deference
in two of its recent cases. Both cases arose in the context of students' free
speech rights. In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,2 the Court
upheld a school's disciplinary actions imposed on a student who gave a
speech at a school assembly that school authorities found lewd and vulgar.
The Court stated that "the determination of what manner of speech in the
classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the
school board.'' 226 In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,227 the Court
upheld a school official's decision to censor articles from a student news-
paper that was operated as a part of the school's curriculum, stating that
"educators do not offend the first amendment. . . so long as their actions
are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. '1228 Hazelwood is
the more important decision because it may be read to identify the scope
of protection to which board decisions are entitled.
This long standing deference should act to legitimate the changes wrought
by the new board in two ways. First, the fact that fundamentalists amassed
sufficient political power to attain majority membership on the board is an
indication that the political process is reflective of the desires of the
community. Second, decisions made by school boards should be accorded
the same degree of deference, regardless of their composition. One com-
mentator warns that this comprehensive authority granted to boards is
"double-edged" as it "insulat[es] the state from parental interference at the
judicial level, yet accord[s] influential groups the power to shape education
and their jobs secure. Id. at 157.
Another author has likewise noted that the combination of use of the media and the
"conflict avoidance" mentality of public school administrators can greatly further the reform-
ers' cause. D. NELKIN, supra note 188, at 151-56. She also believes that court decisions like
that in Edwards may actually be publicized by defeated plaintiffs in such a way as to make
school and state officials look more oppressive and the fundamentalist position look more
sympathetic by using judicial defeats to "support their image as a beleaguered group, rejected
by a scientific establishment bent on protecting itself against 'new' ideas." Id. at 146.
223. See, e.g., Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2577; Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675, 683 (1986); Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923).
224. Strossen, supra note 87, at 354.
225. 478 U.S. 675.
226. Id. at 683.
227. 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).
228. Id. at 571.
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along religious lines at the school board level without judicial scrutiny."' ' 9
This insulation, however, is not as comprehensive as might be feared. The
increasing availability of alternatives such as home schooling and other
accommodations suggests that parental activism can be influential, and the
Supreme Court has indicated that there are limits on a school board's
discretion.
All boards must operate within the confines of the Constitution; therefore,
the decisions made by the new board will not be automatically insulated
from review. Rather, just like the decisions made by other boards, its
decisions will be scrutinized to assess their compliance with establishment
clause doctrine. The Supreme Court recently noted the "considerable dis-
cretion" afforded both to states and to local school boards in operating
the public schools in Edwards v. Aguillard.20 After applying the three-
pronged test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman,2' however, the Court found
that the state of Louisiana had abused this discretion in adopting its balanced
treatment act. The Court stated that "discretion of the States and local
school boards in matters of education must be exercised in a manner that
comports with the transcendent imperatives of the First Amendment.
23 2
This clearly indicates that discretionary governmental acts, whether state or
local, are subject to scrutiny and potential invalidation.
The actual ability to shape a school's curriculum to reflect the values of
a school board dominated by religiously affiliated members may further be
curtailed or even negated by the paradoxical situation in which the majority
of the board's membership find themselves. The Supreme Court held that
a person may not be excluded from the political process on the basis of his
religious beliefs or his position in a religious organization when it struck
down a Tennessee statute barring clergymen from holding political office
in McDaniel v. Paly.23 The Court stated that "the American experience
provides no persuasive support for the fear that clergymen in public office
will be less careful of anti-establishment interests or less faithful to their
oaths of civil office than their unordained counterparts.
'234
This statement serves as an admonition to any candidate or office holder
with aspirations of effecting changes of a religious or moral nature through
the political process that such changes must be able to withstand the rigors
229. Religion and the State, supra note 101, at 1668.
230. 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2577.
231. 403 U.S. 602.
232. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2577 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864
(1981)) (emphasis added).
233. 435 U.S. 618 (1978). The Court held that the statute was unconstitutional because it
forced the plaintiff to surrender his free exercise rights in order to exercise his right to seek
and hold office. Id. at 626.
234. Id. at 629.
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of establishment clause analysis. 235 The Court has made it clear that actions
implemented or endorsed by state agencies which are blatantly of a religious
nature, such as posting scriptures in public classrooms 23 6 or legislating prayer
into public schools23 7 are destined for invalidation. A school board, however,
even if identifiable by religious affiliation, may be able to make substantive
changes in the curriculum which reflect its own values if the changes are
made cautiously and with the constraints of the establishment clause, and
the concomitant potential for challenge on constitutional grounds, 238 firmly
in mind.
The challenge facing the new boarl is precisely the one faced by other
boards: Can the texts and materials it has identified and adopted as
appropriate for use in its school system survive establishment clause analysis
under the Lemon test? While the former board's decisions would probably
be most vulnerable to an effect prong challenge, 239 the choices of the new
board would be vulnerable on either the purpose or effect prong.
The new board may assert that its choice was based on such concededly
legitimate secular bases as topic coverage or skill development. The Supreme
Court, however, has indicated that it will look past asserted purposes for
evidence by which to assess whether the decision was primarily motivated
by a legitimate secular purpose or whether the asserted purpose was a
sham. 240 For example, the statements of the sponsor of the balanced treat-
ment act in Edwards were taken as evidence of improper purpose violative
of the establishment clause. 241 Statements made by board members to the
press or during adoption committee meetings indicating that the texts were
evaluated and chosen based on religious criteria might likewise be taken as
evidence of improper purpose. Courts might even look back to campaign
speeches or slogans that suggest that the board members attained their
positions of power on a platform of infusing religion into the schools.
The board may be able to avoid invalidation on these grounds by keeping
the "paper trail" following its policy decisions free of comments that could
lead to the conclusion that its decisions were based on illegitimate purposes.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 81-121, 199-208.
236. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
237. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
238. See supra text accompanying notes 81-121, 199-208.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 103-20.
240. The Supreme Court has been criticized for relying on motive review as a basis for
invalidating legislation or administrative decisions. See generally Note, Creation Science and
the Balanced Treatment Acts: Examining McLean v. Board of Education and a Modest
Prediction on Keith v. Department of Education, 7 OKLA. CiTy U.L. REv. 109, 118-22 (1982).
As recently as 1987, however, the Court has defended the legitimacy of motive review when
it stated that "[tihe plain meaning of the statute's words.[or, here, the board's policies],
enlightened by their context, and the contemporaneous legislative history, can control the
determination of legislative purpose." Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2583.
241. Edwards, 107 S. Ct. at 2579.
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Justice O'Connor has indicated that such a clean official record, which
"manifest[s] a secular purpose and'omit[s] all sectarian endorsements,"
would constitute a sufficient basis for her to defer, at least initially, to the
government's stated purpose, as she has "little doubt that our courts are
capable of distinguishing a sham secular purpose from a sincere one."
242
Additionally, given the history of variation that the statement of purpose
prong has taken,243 it is entirely possible that "a" secular purpose may
someday be sufficient once again.
Dicta from a 1982 Supreme Court case may bolster the ability of the new
board's decision to withstand constitutional scrutiny. In Board of Education
v. Pico,2 4 the Supreme Court invalidated a local board's decision to remove
books from the school's library. The Court found that if the removal
decision was based on an intent to deny students access to ideas with which
the board disagreed, "[the board had] exercised [its] discretion in violation
of the Constitution. ' ' 245 Although this abuse of discretion standard might
appear to work against the new board, the decision specifically differentiates
the unique, voluntary nature of the library from the compulsory environment
of the classroom, and states that the "[board members] might well defend
their claim of absolute discretion in matters of curriculum. '"2A
Even if the new board's textbook choices can pass muster under the
purpose prong of Lemon, they may still fail under the effect prong. Adopted
texts must not advance nor inhibit religion, either directly or indirectly,- 7
but the board's selections may find some degree of shelter in that part of
the Supreme Court's establishment doctrine which provides that a govern-
mental act does not necessarily violate the establishment clause simply
because it "happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or
all religions." ' However, if the new board adopts texts which the plaintiffs
242. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 75 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
243. See supra text accompanying notes 91-97.
244. 457 U.S. 853.
245. Id. at 871.
246. Id. at 869 (emphasis in original). A federal court recently focused on this broad
discretion to make curricular decisions in upholding a school board's decision to remove two
works of literature from the English curriculum. The board decision at issue in Virgil v.
School Board, 677 F. Supp. 1547 (M.D. Fla. 1988), was based in part on the conclusion that
the works contained sexual references and vulgarity inappropriate for the age, maturity, and
development of the students. Id. at 1549. The court acknowledged that "the school board's
decision reflect[ed] its own restrictive views of the appropriate values to which [the school's]
students should be exposed," but relied on the deferential review accorded to curricular
decisions by the Supreme Court in Hazelwood and found that "such content-based decision-
making is permissible [as] educators may limit both 'the style and content of curricular
decisions if their action is reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."' Id. at 1552
(quoting Hazelwood, 108 S. Ct. at 571).
247. See supra text accompanying notes 103-04.
248. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980) (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 422 (1961)).
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in the cases discussed herein would approve, or which are mass-produced
for Christian home educators, 249 it is quite foreseeable that such choices
might go beyond the scope of coincidence or harmony.
Election of a school board may be the best way for fundamentalist groups
to effect lasting changes in the curricula of their local schools. If the board
works within its constitutional limits, which are concededly very broad, the
programs and materials implemented by public schools are open to modi-
fication. This modification process may result in public schools that reflect
and inculcate the kind of values that many parents find deplorably lacking
in today's public schools.
CONCLUSION
Control over the content of public education has become a struggle
between competing interests, most typically between school boards, who
seek to present progressive, humanistic ideas, and parents, who seek the
inclusion of religious convictions which they feel are lacking in contemporary
curricula. The substantive questions presented by this struggle center around
two poles. First, what kind of moral or religious content can be constitu-
tionally included in public education? Second, what remedies are available
for parents who object to the content of public education, even if it falls
within what has been identified as the constitutional range?
Parents who wish to instill in their children values different from those
inculcated by state-funded schools may seek highly individualized accom-
modations such as substitution and exclusion remedies or home schooling.
Such remedies, however, could raise countervailing concerns regarding the
quality of education that the children will receive based on the instructional
materials and socialization alternatives that are adopted.
Alternatively, the parents might look to the judicial system for an adju-
dication of their rights relative to those of the state. The prospects of
prevailing on an establishment clause challenge currently appear bleak as
federal courts have thus far been resistant to imposing on schools the
sweeping systemic change that such a holding would entail. Further, the
courts have evaded (and are likely to continue to evade) finding that secular
humanism is a religion, a finding that would have to underlie a successful
establishment clause challenge. Despite the failure of the Mozert claimants,
a free exercise challenge is more likely to succeed than a challenge based
on the establishment clause. The remedy sought in this type of claim is
more individualized and implementation would be less disruptive to the
operation of the school system. More importantly, plaintiffs in a free exercise
case would not have to prove that secular humanism is a religion in order
249. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
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to prevail. They must instead prove that the school's practices constitute a
burden on their religious beliefs sufficient to establish a violation of the
first amendment.
Objecting parents might also turn to the political process in order to
control the decision-making bodies that shape public education. A political
remedy is complicated by the paradoxical constraints that constitutional
mandates put on religious actors in the political arena. Religious actors
cannot be excluded from the political process; they, therefore, have the
capability to attain decision-making power. Once in office, however, it may
be very difficult for these officials to make the kinds of changes which
undoubtedly prompted their entry into the political scene without running
afoul of the establishment clause. At present it seems clear that state
legislation that attempts to mandate activities or instruction is certain to be
invalidated as a violation of the establishment clause. It is less clear that
curricular changes made by school boards that might be justified as "pur-
suing legitimate pedagogical goals"' ' 0 are doomed to similar invalidation.
The American public educational system provides the vital services of
imparting knowledge and instilling qualities and values in young people in
order that they may be productive members of society. While this is a
compelling state purpose, it cannot be pursued heedless of the burdens that
may be placed on the religious beliefs of certain segments of society. At
the point where provision of public education becomes oppressive, the
opportunity for escape from majoritarian institutions must be provided to
the religious adherent; otherwise, the constitutional guarantee of free exercise
will have meaning only for the mainstream. At the same time, however,
adherence to the constraints of the establishment clause demand that state-
provided public education be kept free from sectarian domination. In 1988,
the Supreme Court stated that "the education of the Nation's youth is
primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local school
officials, and not of federal judges."'5 However, because of the rifts that
sometimes occur between the entities that the Court sees as the appropriate
arbiters of educational policy, federal courts are increasingly called upon to
provide judicial remedies and police the constitutional boundaries of non-
judicial remedies in an effort to strike the balance between the goals of a
state-provided education and the rights of individuals to the free exercise
of their religious beliefs.
KPLY S. SHOBE
250. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562, 571 (1988).
251. Id. at 571.
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